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Abstract  
 
This paper provides evidence on the incidence of poverty among the elderly 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, based on household survey microdata 
from 20 countries. The situation of older people is characterized in terms of 
income, employment, education, health and access to services vis-à-vis the 
rest of the population. The paper identifies the role played by the current 
pension systems in Latin America, and assesses the efforts needed to achieve 
substantial improvements toward the reduction of old-age poverty.  
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1. Introduction  
Poverty has a relevant age dimension. Both needs and income potential change over the 
life cycle, modifying the probability of falling into poverty. This paper is focused on the 
situation of the elderly relative to the rest of the population. In developed countries the 
combination of strong social security systems, well-developed capital markets, and 
small households contribute to higher living standards for the elderly, relative to the rest 
of the population. These conditions are not replicated in many developing countries, 
where pensions systems are weak and mostly favor the non-poor, the long-term formal 
credit market is almost inexistent, and the elderly usually live in large extended 
households sharing the budget with a large number of children.  
Identifying the extent to which older persons are affected by poverty vis-à-vis the rest of 
the population is essential to include the age dimension into social policy discussions. 
Unfortunately, the task of measuring relative poverty across age groups is plagued by 
methodological problems and data limitations. Moreover, these limitations do not bias 
the results in only one direction: old age poverty may be higher or lower than what the 
statistics show.  
This paper is aimed at assessing the situation of the elderly in terms of income poverty 
and other dimensions of well-being in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The 
evidence is drawn from a large database of household surveys from 20 LAC countries. 
To our knowledge this is the first large-scale study that focuses on the poverty situation 
of the elderly in Latin America based on a large comparable set of household surveys.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start in section 2 by characterizing the 
age structure of the population, and the household arrangements where older people 
live. In addition we discuss the ageing process experienced by the region, and the 
forecasts for the demographic structure of the LAC population. In section 3 we first 
discuss poverty measurement issues, and then assess the incidence of poverty among 
older persons in Latin America and the Caribbean under alternative proxies for 
individual living standards. We compare our results to those found in other developing 
regions of the world. While in section 3 we deal with income poverty, in section 4 we 
enrich the analysis by including other dimensions of individual well-being: education, 
health, access to the labor market and to basic infrastructure (water, sanitation, housing, 
electricity). The role of the social security system is crucial in understanding old age 
poverty. In section 5 we examine pension systems in Latin America and assess the 
observed and potential effectiveness of pensions to reduce poverty. In section 6 we 
carry out a set of microsimulation exercises in order to analyze the possible patterns 
toward meeting the target of halving poverty for the elderly. In particular, we compute 
isopoverty curves that show combinations of neutral growth and redistributive policies 
toward the elderly capable of attaining the goal of halving old age poverty by year 2015. 
In section 7 we take the ageing process as giving and carry out some simple 
microsimulations to estimate its impact on national and old age poverty. Section 8 
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closes the paper with an assessment of the results and their policy implications toward 
the aim of mitigating old age poverty.  
 
2. The elderly in Latin America and the Caribbean 
The population ageing process all over the world is a well-acknowledged fact. Latin 
America and the Caribbean have not been the exception from this widespread 
phenomenon. According to the United Nations World Population Prospect, the life 
expectancy in the region will grow 55% between 1950 and 2050: a person who will be 
born in 2050 will live 28 years more than a similar person who was born in 1950 (see 
table 2.1). In fact, life expectancy has been growing in LAC at rates above the world 
mean.   
In LAC, as in the rest of the world, the gender gap in terms of life expectancy has 
widened in favor of women in the last 50 years (from 3.4 years in 1950 to 6.7 years in 
2000). That gap is expected to slightly shrink in the coming decades, due to a more 
intense fall in the male mortality rate.  
The fact that the world, and Latin America in particular, are ageing is clear from the last 
panel of table 2.1. The median age of the world population has increased from 23.9 to 
26.8 since 1950, and it is expected to grow to 37.8 by 2050. The speed of the ageing 
process has been faster in Latin America compared to the rest of the world, and it is 
expected to continue being faster in the following decades. In fact, while in 1950 the 
average Latin-American was almost 4 years younger than the average person in the 
world; in 2015 a typical inhabitant of Latin America will be 2 years older than the world 
average.  
Another way to illustrate the ageing process is by dividing the population in age 
brackets. We consider four groups: <15, 15-24, 25-59, and +60, and label the latter 
group as the elderly. This definition, although entirely arbitrary, is useful for the 
analysis, as any reasonable alternative definition not based only in age is almost 
impossible to implement with the usual data at hand. We follow the general practice in 
LAC to define the elderly as those aged 60 or more. In some sections of this document 
we assess the robustness of the results to changes in that threshold.  
The ageing process discussed above has implied a substantial increase in the share of 
older people in the population (see figure 2.1). This pattern holds in every continent, but 
it is particularly significant in Europe. In LAC the share of the elderly in the population 
increased from around 6% in 1950 to more than 8% in 2000, while it is expected to 
reach 24% at the end of the century. This ageing process implies an estimate of around 
200 million people older than 60 in LAC by 2050. 
Figure 2.2 shows that during the last 50 years the annual rate of population growth of 
the LAC elderly has been higher than the corresponding rate for the younger age 
brackets. The gap between them has widened since 1980. It is expected that this gap 
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will continue to enlarge during the first two decades of the new millennium (reaching a 
value 4 times bigger than in 1950), and then probably will start shrinking (Figure 2.2).  
The intensity of the population ageing process has been heterogeneous across LAC 
countries. Figure 2.3 illustrates this heterogeneity by showing the annual growth rate of 
the population ratio +60/<60 in each LAC country. That ratio has substantially 
increased in Argentina, Venezuela and Cuba, while it almost has not changed in 
Mexico, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Only two LAC countries experienced a substantial 
fall in the ratio +60/<60: Paraguay and Haiti.  
The current (2005) and the estimated future (2015 and 2050) population share of the 
elderly in each LAC country is displayed in figure 2.4. In all countries the share of the 
elderly is expected to substantially grow in the coming decades. All LAC societies will 
have to face the challenges related to an ageing society in the near future. However, as 
this and the previous figures show, the intensity of these challenges will vary across 
countries. 
 
Socio-demographic characterization of the elderly 
In order to get deeper into the analysis of the socio-economic situation of the elderly in 
LAC we need to go beyond the basic demographic information included in Census, and 
use microdata from household surveys. In the rest of the paper we present a socio-
economic characterization of older people in LAC based on a large database of 
household surveys from 21 countries: the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), assembled by CEDLAS (Universidad Nacional de La 
Plata) and the World Bank’s LAC poverty group (LCSPP). SEDLAC includes more 
than 150 household surveys in 20 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. For this paper we select a sample of surveys corresponding to the latest 
observation in each country (see table 2.2). 
The sample covers all countries in mainland Latin America and three of the largest 
countries in the Caribbean – Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. In each period the 
sample of countries represents more than 92% of LAC total population. Most household 
surveys included in the sample are nationally representative. The main two exceptions 
are Argentina and Uruguay, where surveys cover only urban population, which 
nonetheless represents more than 85% of the total population in both countries.  
The population structure drawn from household survey microdata for each LAC country 
in our sample is presented in table 2.3. On average, older people (60+) represent around 
10% of total population. Figure 2.5 illustrates the heterogeneity within the region. While 
older people in Guatemala and Nicaragua represent 6% of their total population, in 
Uruguay and Argentina that share is 3 and 2 times greater, respectively. 
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The share of the elderly in the population is larger in rural areas than in cities (Figure 
2.6). One possible reason behind this fact is that urban areas offer a wider range of labor 
possibilities for younger people, which may encourage them to migrate into those areas 
in order to improve their socio-economic situation. 
Table 2.4 shows the population ratios between the elderly and the rest of the population 
in each country. On average, the elderly are 32% of the children (<15). Figure 2.7 
shows the heterogeneity within LAC. While in Uruguay the number of older people is 
roughly the same as the number of children (<15), in Guatemala the proportion is 1 
older people for around 8 children. As expected, the population ratio elderly/children is 
greater for women than for men. In Uruguay, for instance, there are 15% more older 
women (>60) than girls (<15), but there are 25% fewer older men than boys.  
As expected from the differences in life expectancy shown above, the gender structure 
differs by age group. In almost all countries the share of women among older people is 
substantially larger than the corresponding share for the youth (figure 2.8). The average 
masculinity index, defined as the ratio between the male population and the female 
population, is 13% higher for the youth (0.97) than for the elderly (0.86) (table 2.5). 
Older people tend to live in households of smaller size than younger people (table 2.6). 
On average in LAC, the elderly live in households with 1.5 persons less than the rest of 
the population. This gap varies from 1 person in Colombia and Venezuela to around 2 
in Guatemala, Argentina and Bolivia. Even though the average family size in rural areas 
is larger than in cities, we do not find significant differences within the older population 
(figure 2.9.b).  
Table 2.7 helps us to learn on the type of households where the elderly live. On average 
in Argentina a typical older people lives in a household with 1.37 older people 
(counting herself), 0.77 adults, 0.26 youngsters and 0.28 children. There is not much 
variation across countries in the number of people older than 60 living in households 
with older people (from 1.40 in Peru to 1.25 in Nicaragua). Differences are sharp in 
terms of children and adults. The average old person in Venezuela lives with 1.52 
adults, while the average old Uruguayan lives with 0.64 adults. In rural areas the 
average LAC old person lives with 20% more children than in cities. 
Around a quarter of all LAC households are headed by an older person. Once again 
there are dissimilarities within the region. For instance, older household heads in 
Bolivia represent 17% of all heads, while in Argentina and Uruguay that proportion 
goes up to 31% and 41%, respectively (table 2.8). In rural areas the share of older 
household heads is higher than in urban areas (figure 2.10.b).  
 
3. Old age poverty  
In this section we provide evidence on the incidence of poverty among older persons in 
Latin America and the Caribbean based on a large set of household surveys. Poverty is 
certainly a multidimensional issue. However, in this section we restrict the concept of 
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poverty to that of income deprivation. In section 4 we extend the analysis to other 
relevant variables as education, health, housing, water, sanitation, and labor market 
opportunities.  
An individual is considered as poor if her living standard indicator is lower than a given 
threshold, known as the poverty line. The practical implementation of this definition 
requires the choice of a proxy for the individual well-being and a poverty line. Most of 
the economic literature suggests using household consumption adjusted for 
demographics as the welfare variable, and a poverty line that combines a certain 
threshold (largely arbitrary) in terms of consumption of calories, with the consumption 
habits of the population, and the domestic prices of goods and services.1  
Although household consumption is a better proxy for welfare than household income, 
in this study we follow the literature in LAC and use income as the well-being indicator. 
A simple reason justifies this practice: few countries in the region routinely conduct 
national household surveys with consumption/expenditures-based questionnaires, while 
all of them include questions on individual and household income.  
The elements needed to construct a poverty line are idiosyncratic to each community, a 
fact that leads to wide differences in the national lines across countries, and introduces 
serious comparability problems. For this reason cross-country comparisons are usually 
made in terms of some simple international line. The most popular one is the USD1-a-
day line proposed in Ravallion et al. (1991). It is a value measured in 1985 international 
prices and adjusted to local currency using purchasing power parities (PPP) to take into 
account local prices. The USD 1 standard was chosen as being representative of the 
national poverty lines found among low-income countries. The line has been 
recalculated in 1993 PPP terms at USD 1.0763 a day (Chen and Ravallion, 2001). The 
USD-2-a-day line is also extensively used in comparisons across middle-income 
countries, like most in LAC. Although the USD-1 or 2-a-day lines have been criticized, 
their simplicity and the lack of reasonable and easy-to-implement alternatives have 
made them the standard for international poverty comparisons.2 For instance, the United 
Nations’ Millennium Development Goal 1 – eradicate extreme poverty and hunger – is 
stated in terms of USD-1-a-day poverty – halving between 1990 and 2015 the 
proportion of people whose income is less than USD 1 a day.  
The measurement of poverty among the elderly poses some additional relevant 
problems. The first one is related to the lack of consumption data. Some older people 
may be living on the assets they accumulated during their lifetimes. The sale of an asset 
is not usually included as current income, and then not considered in a poverty analysis. 
While this could be the proper practice for, say, a young adult that sells his car to later 
buy a new one, it might be incorrect for an older person who periodically sells assets to 
keep his/her living standard.  
                                                 
1 See for instance Deaton and Zaidi (2003).  
2 See Srinivasan (2004), Kakwani (2004) and Ravallion (2004) for a discussion on the merits and 
demerits of the USD-1-a-day line.  
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An additional problem is posed by the fact that resources may be unevenly allocated 
within households. The typical information included in an income-based household 
survey does not allow identifying the specific allocation scheme adopted by each 
household. For these reason the usual practice is to assume complete within-household 
equality in living standards.   
Another relevant problem arises from the fact that older people usually live in 
households with a significantly different demographic structure than the rest of the 
population, as documented in the previous section. That difference makes the poverty 
comparisons between the elderly and the non-elderly population highly dependent on 
the assumptions about the impact of the household structure on individual well-beings. 
In particular, older people tend to live in households of smaller size, which impedes 
them taking advantage of the household consumption economies of scale.  
In summary, although we recognize that poverty is a multidimensional complex 
problem, data limitations restrict this paper (and most of the literature) to simply 
consider the poor as those individuals living in households whose per capita income is 
lower than a certain international poverty line in terms of PPP dollars. Most researchers 
and practitioners seem to agree that this is a reasonable approximation to a complex 
problem. In this paper we use that widespread definition and assess the robustness of the 
results to some methodological changes (economies of scale, adult equivalents and 
consumption data). 
 
Evidence  
We provide evidence on poverty by age groups for a sample of 20 LAC countries. 
Evidence is drawn from microdata of the SEDLAC database described in section 2. 
Even after agreeing on the income variable and the poverty line, a large number of 
methodological problems should be solved to compute poverty in each country. Specific 
details on methodological issues could be found in the SEDLAC web page.3   
Poverty rates significantly differ across LAC countries. Table 3.1 shows the headcount 
ratios for the USD2-a-day poverty line. While the share of persons with household per 
capita income below that line is 5.1% in Chile, the share climbs to 78% in Haiti. 
Poverty is substantially higher in rural areas.4  
The correlation between national poverty and poverty in any age group is very high. For 
instance, the linear correlation coefficient for the case of the elderly (older than 60) is 
0.95. Figure 3.1 illustrates this close relationship. It is interesting to notice that most 
points lie close but below the 45° line, implying lower poverty rates for the elderly 
when compared to the rest of the population. That is the case in both urban and rural 
areas. This piece of evidence does not imply that poverty is always decreasing in age. In 
                                                 
3 www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/sedlac    
4 See Cicowiez et al. (2006) for evidence on the urban-rural differences.  
 7
fact when compared to the adult population in most countries poverty is higher for the 
elderly (figure 3.2). Defining the elderly as those older than 60 or those older than 65 
does not make a significant difference. 
To further document the age-poverty profile in figure 3.3 we show non-parametric 
(kernel) estimates of the poverty headcount ratio by age in each LAC country. The 
curves are clearly downward sloped along all the age range for the set of Southern Cone 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay). In contrast, for the rest of the 
countries poverty is clearly decreasing only until around the age of 40, and then 
becomes either constant (e.g. Paraguay, El Salvador, Nicaragua), slightly increasing 
(e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) or substantially increasing (e.g. Colombia, Mexico). 
For the South American countries with well-developed pensions systems poverty 
reaches its minimum levels in the older age brackets (table 3.2). In Argentina and Chile 
the poverty rate for those older than 60 is around a third of the poverty rate for the total 
population. That proportion drops to 20% in Brazil and just 10% in Uruguay. In 
contrast, in some other LAC countries old age poverty is more than 20% higher than the 
national rates. That is the case of Jamaica and Mexico.5   
The shape of the age-poverty profiles is surely dependent on factors like the extent of 
the pension system and the age-education profile. We postpone a discussion on these 
factors to first investigate another likely determinant of the poverty gaps by age: the 
demographic structure of households.   
 
The role of the demographic structure  
So far, we have measured poverty using per capita income as the individual well-being 
indicator. It has long been argued that needs differ across age groups and that 
households can take advantage of their size by exploiting consumption economies of 
scale (Deaton, 1997). These economies allow a couple to live with less than double the 
budget of a person living alone.6 According to this approach individual well-being is 
proxied by total household income deflated by an equivalence scale, defined as a 
function of the size of the household and its demographic composition. There is a long-
standing literature on equivalence scales (see Deaton and Paxson, 1998). We follow the 
approach of Buhmann et al. (1988) and Deaton and Paxson (1997) by assuming a 
parametric form for the equivalence scale and examining the consequences of changing 
the parameters. In particular, we assume that the living standard of an individual i living 
in household h is given by  
θαα )( 2211 ACC
Yx hih ++=  
                                                 
5 Notice that although the ratio in Costa Rica is high, the difference in poverty points is small, and even 
probably not significant.   
6 For instance two persons can save costs by living together and having one restroom to share.  
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where A is the number of adults, C1 the number of children under 5 years old, and C2 
the number of children between 6 and 14.7 Parameters α allow for different weights for 
adults and kids, while θ regulates the degree of household economies of scale. When 
θ=1 there are no economies of scale, while in the other extreme when θ=0, there are full 
economies of scale, meaning that all goods in the household could be shared completely 
(i.e. they are all public goods, with no rivalry in consumption). In very underdeveloped 
economies where people spend nearly all their income in food, there is no much scope 
for economies of scale (a potato eaten by one member of the household cannot be eaten 
by another member). In developed economies where a much larger share of the budget 
is spent in housing, entertainment and other goods easier to share, consumption 
economies of scale are more important. Following the suggestion of Deaton and Zaidi 
(2002) for middle-income countries like those in LAC we take intermediate values of 
the αs (α1=0.5 and α2=0.75) and θ (0.8) as the benchmark case.  
To illustrate the adjustment for economies of scale, consider two households, labeled as 
A and B, for simplicity comprised only by adults, with the same household per capita 
income ($1000) but with different household size (2 persons in A and 5 persons in B). 
Using θ=0.8 implies that, despite per capita income is the same in both households, 
equivalized income is 20% higher in household B ($1380 in B, and $1149 in A).  
Notice that in the same way as in the above example, countries where family 
arrangements imply larger households can take advantage better of the consumption 
economies of scale, even with a common parameter θ. In addition, one can assume or 
estimate different parameters θ across countries based on different consumption budget 
structures (see Deaton, 1997), but this is well beyond the scope of this paper.   
In practice it is convenient to work with a transformation of the above equation to make 
poverty estimates comparable to those obtained with household per capita income and 
the USD-2-a-day line. The need for an adjustment comes from the fact that by deflating 
by  instead of by just the number of family members , 
the indicator of individual welfare x
θαα )( 2211 ACC ++ )( 21 ACC ++
ih increases, and then poverty estimates go down. 
We alleviate (although not eliminate) this nuisance by following the procedure 
suggested by Deaton and Paxson (1997), and multiplying the above equation by 
, where C)/()( 002
0
1
00
22
0
11 ACCACC ++++ θαα 10, C20 and A0 are the number of 
children under 5, children between 6 and 14 and adults in the “base” household. We 
take the average number of children and adults in each country to construct the base 
family.   
Table 3.3 shows older people relative poverty using four alternative income variables: 
(i) per capita household income, (ii) household income per adult equivalent, (iii) 
household income adjusted for economies of scale, and (iv) household income per adult 
equivalent adjusted for economies of scale. The consideration of these demographic 
                                                 
7 Van Praag has suggested the possibility of using different weights for the elderly as their nutritional 
needs may be lower than those of the adult population. The argument loses strength when expanding the 
needs to other goods and services (e.g. health).   
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factors implies an increase in the relative poverty of the elderly. As seen in section 2 
older people live in smaller households, and then they are not able to take advantage of 
consumption economies of scale. Also, the increase in equivalized income after the 
adjustment for the lower needs of children does not particularly favor the elderly, who 
on average live in households with a smaller number of children.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the change in poverty when carrying out the adjustments. Relative 
old age poverty significantly increases in Bolivia and Mexico when considering adult 
equivalents and economies of scale. The effect goes in the same direction in the cases of 
Argentina and Brazil, although the impact is quantitatively less relevant. This is not 
surprising, given the smaller household size (and number of children) in Argentina and 
Brazil, compared to Bolivia and Mexico.  
The impact of considering different parameters for economies of scale is analyzed with 
the help of Table 3.4 and Figure 3.5. As the parameter goes from 1 to 0 consumption 
economies of scale internal to the household turn more important, and relative old age 
poverty increases in all countries. In many countries the sign of the poverty comparison 
between the elderly and the rest does not depend on the parameter of economies of scale 
(given the adult equivalent scale used). For instance, in Bolivia old age poverty is 
always higher than national poverty, while the opposite is true in Brazil, regardless of 
the degree of economies of scale. In some other countries the sign of the difference 
depends on the parameter: that is the case of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and Venezuela. The curves for other countries like Argentina and Chile also 
cross the unity line, although they do so at improbable values of the parameter of 
economies of scale.  
 
Characterizing poverty-age profiles 
As shown above, old age poverty substantially differs across LAC countries. Countries 
are different not only in terms of total old age poverty, but what is more relevant for this 
study, also in elderly poverty relative to the rest of the population. What are the factors 
behind the country differences in poverty-age profiles? This question is important since 
it helps to understand why in some countries old age poverty is not a particularly urging 
problem, at least when compared to poverty for other age groups. Unfortunately, 
disentangling the complex process leading to old age poverty, even in a single country, 
is a very difficult topic that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Rather than attempting 
econometric estimations that will face all sort of data and endogeneity problems, in this 
section we just show some simple correlations that motivate the possible links between 
certain characteristics of the economy and old age poverty.   
For many reasons, for most people the income potential diminishes after a certain age, 
and then income poverty is more likely to occur. Societies all around the world have 
developed pension systems to shield older people against these risks. Old age poverty is 
then expected to be highly correlated with the development of the pension system. The 
first panel in figure 3.6 shows a simple scatter plot between relative old age poverty 
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(+60/-60) and the share of old people in the population receiving pension payments. The 
linear correlation is -0.85 suggesting a strong positive relationship between both 
variables.8 The relationship is driven by the presence of two clearly different set of 
countries: those Southern Cone countries with a relatively-well developed pension 
system where more than half of the population is covered (on average, 66%), and the 
rest of LAC countries where on average only 14% of the elderly is covered. Within this 
group the correlation poverty-pensions is not statistically significant.  
Older people might be poorer just because they are less educated than the younger 
generations. As will be documented in the next section, all LAC countries have 
experienced an education upgrading process which implies that younger people are 
more skilled and hence better prepared for the labor market. The second panel in figure 
3.6 shows that there is a positive relationship between relative old age poverty and the 
gap in years of education between the elderly and the adult population. The correlation 
coefficient however is small and barely significant (0.27).   
As argued above, the size of the household could be linked to the degree of income 
poverty. The third panel of figure 3.6 shows the scatter plot of relative old age poverty 
and the gap in household size between those older than 60 and the rest of the 
population. In countries where that gap is large, that is where older people live in 
households substantially smaller than younger people, relative old age poverty is lower.  
However, this positive link is entirely driven by two countries, Argentina and Uruguay, 
with low old age poverty and family arrangements such that a large fraction of the 
elderly, many of whom receive pension payments, lives alone. The linear correlation 
coefficient is 0.42; it falls to 0.34 when computing poverty with household income 
adjusted for economies of scale and adult equivalents, and vanishes to zero when 
deleting Argentina and Uruguay from the sample.  
In a cross-country regression (with only 20 observations!) the coefficient of the size of 
the pension system is always significant, even when controlling for education and 
household size. In contrast, when controlling for the pension system the coefficients of 
education and household size become non-significant. In summary, this preliminary 
evidence suggests that there exists a strong negative relationship between relative old 
age poverty and the development of the pension system. The evidence about the links 
between old age poverty with education and household size is weaker.  
 
Older people in the income distribution  
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of people older than 60 across quintiles of the income 
distribution. The elderly are over-represented in the top quintile of the household per 
capita income distribution in all countries, except Jamaica. When considering the 
distribution of equivalized household income (θ=0.8, α1=0.5, α2=0.75) the elderly 
                                                 
8 The correlation coefficient is -0.87 when computing relative poverty as +60/-15, and -0.85 when 
computing poverty with household income adjusted for economies of scale and adult equivalents.  
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become under-represented in five countries. While in the first panel the share of old 
people in the top quintile exceeds 25% in 15 countries, that number falls to 5 countries 
in the second panel. When using equivalized income as the welfare indicator, in more 
than half of the LAC countries the share of the elderly in the bottom quintile is larger 
than 20%, implying over-representation of older people among the poorest.  
Another way of showing the location of the elderly in the income distribution is through 
concentration curves. Each curve shows the cumulative share of the elderly for the 
poorest p percent of the population. Figure 3.7 shows these curves for a sample of 
countries. If the curve lies above the diagonal (the perfect equality line) means that the 
distribution of older people is biased toward the low-income strata. Suppose the 
government implements a transfer of $1 to each old person. That policy will be pro-poor 
(pro-rich) in those countries where the concentration curve lies above (below) the 
diagonal.  
Some results are worth mentioning. First, the curves do not locate too far from the 
diagonal, meaning a not particularly biased distribution of the elderly in the population. 
Second, there is not a homogeneous location of the concentration curves across LAC 
economies. In some countries the curves lie below, in others above, and in others they 
cross the diagonal.  
 
Box 3.1: Income vs. consumption poverty. The case of Nicaragua 
In this box we illustrate the differences between income and consumption poverty of the 
elderly vis-à-vis the rest of the population, using the Living Standard Measurement 
Survey of Nicaragua, 2001. This LSMS is one of the few Latin American surveys with 
reliable information on both income and consumption. The following table shows the 
ratio of poverty levels between age groups using the two alternative indicators of well-
being.  
      Relative poverty
60 +/<60 60+/<15
income poverty 0.82 0.70
consumption poverty 0.78 0.66  
Source: own calculations based on the EMNV 2001.  
Notice that old age poverty relative to the rest of the population is lower when measured 
with consumption rather than income. Figure B3.1 shows that while when measured 
with income, poverty slightly increases for the elderly (with respect to adults), it 
actually goes mildly down when measured with consumption. As expected old age 
poverty is a less worrisome problem when measured with consumption data.   
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Box 3.2 Subjective poverty and the elderly. The case of Colombia  
An alternative approach to determine whether a person achieves a minimum standard of 
living consists in asking if they consider themselves to be poor. It is interesting to study 
whether subjective poverty is higher among the elderly, independently of objective 
measures of deprivation.  
Colombia’s Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida asks household heads (or their spouses) 
whether they would rate themselves as poor. Figure B3.2 illustrates the relationship 
between self-assessment of welfare and age. As people age, the negative perception of 
their economic well beings tends to slightly increase.  
Whereas on average around 66% of people aged 25 to 59 consider themselves as poor, 
that share increases to 70.3% for people older than 60 (table B3.1). Notice that around 
90% of the elderly living in rural areas are poor under this subjective measure.  
For people older than 25, we estimate a basic probit model for the probability of being 
poor according to the subjective perceptions of individuals. The set of control covariates 
includes two age dummies (“old people” is the omitted category), a gender dummy, a 
set of educational dummies, an urban dummy, household size and dummies regarding 
labor status. As table B3.2 shows, once controlling by observable characteristics the 
conclusions are different. The likelihood of rating oneself as poor is not significantly 
different for the elderly and adults aged 50 to 59. Moreover, individuals between 25 and 
49 years old are more likely to be poor according to this approach than old people. The 
higher non-conditional likelihood of being poor of the elderly seems to be due to 
differences in other observable characteristics, like educational levels. The other 
estimated coefficients, in general, show the expected sign.   
 
 
Inequality  
Is income inequality higher among the elderly? The answer seems to depend again on 
the relevance of the pension system in each country. Table 3.6 shows that the Gini 
coefficient for the income distribution among the elderly is lower than for the rest of the 
population in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. The results are robust to the change 
in the individual well-being indicator.  
The economic literature has discussed whether ageing societies tend to be less unequal. 
There is a strong presumption in favor of more equal economies, at least in terms of 
incomes, in ageing societies with well-developed pension systems. The serious analysis 
of the interplay between the demographic structure of the population and the income 
distribution is beyond the scope of this paper. As an exploratory analysis we present in 
figure 3.8 a simple scatter plot across LAC countries between mean age and the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of per capita income. The seemingly negative correlation 
is driven by Uruguay. As soon as we delete that observation, the negative correlation 
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vanishes (the linear correlation coefficient becomes non-significant). Similar results 
arise when using the share of older people in the population instead of mean age. At 
least in the context of LAC where pension systems are poorly developed, the equalizing 
effect of an ageing society does not show up, at least at a first glance.  
 
Old age poverty in the developing world  
The evidence on relative old age poverty in the developing world is still too scarce and 
non-systematic to identify a clear pattern. Comparisons across studies are mined by all 
sort of methodological problems, arising from the choice of different poverty lines, 
different measures of well-being, and different definitions of later life (Barrientos et al., 
2003). But even within a specific study patterns are not easy to identify. As we have 
found for the case of Latin America, other studies report that in other regions of the 
developing world while in some countries old age poverty is lower, in others it is higher 
than national poverty. Moreover, the results of these comparisons are affected by the 
assumptions on economies of scale and adult equivalents (Lanjouw et al., 1998). In 
contrast to the mixed results for the developing world, most studies find that in 
advanced economies poverty is significantly lower among older people (Whitehouse, 
2000).  
In table 3.7 we reproduce some results of previous studies on developing countries. 
Deaton and Paxson (1997) conducted a detailed analysis of old age poverty for 
countries of different regions, while Grootaert and Braithwaite (1998) and Lanjouw et 
al. (1998) use information from the Household Expenditure and Income Data for 
Transition Economies. In none of these studies a clear pattern for old age poverty arises. 
In a recent study Kakwani and Subbarao (2005) find that while poverty is higher among 
households with older persons (particularly in rural areas) in Malawi, Uganda and 
Zambia, this is not the case in Madagascar, Mozambique and Nigeria, where children 
were assessed to be in worse situation. Based on these pieces of evidence Barrientos et 
al. (2003) conclude that “poverty in later life broadly reflects aggregate poverty”. This 
conclusion seems correct on average, but does not apply to many countries, as table 3.7 
and the LAC evidence shown in this paper suggest.  
 
4. The socioeconomic situation of the elderly 
In this section other dimensions of well-being are explored. So far, only income 
deprivation has been taken into consideration. However, well-being is a multi-
dimensional concept. Clearly, variables such as health, education, basic infrastructure 
and security affect the quality of life. These variables have a positive correlation with 
income, but the correlation is far from being perfect, due in part to the impossibility of 
buying some attributes of well-being. Another well-known difficulty that reinforces the 
necessity of examining other dimensions of individual welfare is the biases resulting 
from measuring poverty with current income (as opposed to permanent income). As 
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discussed above, these biases may distort the poverty comparisons between the elderly 
and other age groups.  
In this section we examine the socioeconomic situation of the elderly compared to the 
rest of the population in terms of access to the labor market, housing, basic 
infrastructure, education and health, by exploiting the dataset of household surveys 
introduced above. We begin by exploring labor opportunities which provides an 
additional understanding of structural poverty, and give us further insight into income 
deprivation of the elderly.  
 
Access to the labor market  
One of the main assets of poor people is their capacity to carry out unskilled work both 
in market activities and in home production. Compared to the non-poor, the work 
performed by the poor involves, in general, a greater amount of physical strength. As 
people age, their ability to perform this kind of tasks diminish, affecting their capacity 
to keep a job or to get another one, exacerbating poverty. 
In order to explore the access of the elderly to the labor market we start by computing 
labor force participation rates for different age groups in all the countries in our sample. 
Table 4.1 shows that in all countries the elderly are less likely to be in the labor force 
than adults aged 25 to 59. The largest differences, in general, correspond to countries 
with stronger pension systems (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and 
Uruguay). In these countries the age gap in labor market participation, which exceeds 
45%, is mainly driven by the lower participation rate of older people, since in those 
economies the participation rate of adults is similar to the regional average.  
Explaining the participation choices of the elderly is an extremely complex issue that 
goes beyond the scope of this paper. In this section we just carry out an exploratory 
analysis of this topic. A reasonable starting point is to compare the participation rate of 
old people receiving pension payments with those who are not receiving these 
payments. As expected, the columns (v) to (vii) of table 4.1 suggest that the former are 
less likely to be in the workforce in all the countries. This could be due to legal 
requirements to stop working once retired, or just to different labor dynamics of old age 
pensioners. The differences are larger than 30 percentage points in the cases of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Haiti and Uruguay.   
To further analyze this issue we estimate binary choice models for the labor force 
participation of older people.9 These models are aimed at estimating the likelihood of 
the elderly of being employed or actively seeking for a job.10 We include as independent 
variables two dummies identifying old people receiving different kinds of non-labor 
                                                 
9  We restrict the sample to those surveys with appropriate information for estimating those models. 
10 The dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 if the individual is employed or unemployed, and 0 if 
she is out of labor force. 
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income (pensions payments and other non-labor income), a set of educational dummy 
variables (“at most 8 years of formal education” is the omitted category), age, marital 
status, a gender dummy, household size, the number of household members with 
positive income (without including the analyzed individual) and a set of regional 
dummies. Table 4.2 displays the marginal probabilities of being part of the labor force 
obtained from the probit regressions. Consistently with the non-conditional analysis, we 
find that receiving pension payments significantly reduces the likelihood of being in the 
workforce. In general, other non-labor incomes also decrease this likelihood (except in 
some few countries), but it is quantitatively less important, presumably because 
pensions represent most of non-labor income in many countries. Besides, in most cases 
the number of household members receiving income significantly decreases the 
likelihood of being in the workforce. This is consistent with the previous result. Other 
relatives working or receiving non-labor income provide a safety net (in some way 
similar to pension payments), which could make work for surviving not necessary. On 
the other hand, it is interesting to notice that among the elderly, in most cases, those 
who live in rural areas or are skilled (more than 13 years of formal education) are more 
prone to be in the labor force.11  
We now turn to the analysis of the age differences in the employment rate. Table 4.3 
shows that old age employment is much lower that the national means. Obviously, this 
could be a sign not only of the higher difficulty of finding jobs for the elderly, but also 
of retirement choices. Some of the older people just choose not to work. Moreover, a 
large employment share of the elderly is not necessarily a social encouraging sign. In 
fact, this could be the consequence of the lack of a strong social security system.12 In 
countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, which have relatively developed 
social security systems, the employment rate of the elderly reaches the lowest values in 
our sample. In these countries, the average share of older people employed is around 
25% (the lowest being Uruguay with 17%). In contrast, the highest rates correspond in 
general to poorer countries without extended pension systems (Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Haiti, Paraguay).  
So far, we have shown that the elderly are less likely to be employed, but they are also 
more likely to be out of the labor market. Since the rate of unemployment is defined as 
the share of economically active people who are out of work and seeking jobs, it is not 
clear whether the unemployment rate for the elderly is higher or lower than for the rest 
                                                 
11 In most cases there is very little difference between old people with low or intermediate level of formal 
education when analyzing participation choices. Increasing the level of qualification from unskilled to 
semi-skilled does not significantly affect the likelihood of being part of the labor force in 11 out of 17 
countries.  
12 The participation models explained above contribute with some evidence to this point. We find that 
safety nets like receiving pension payments or living in families with other income earners reduce the 
probability of old people of being in the labor force (and presumably the likelihood of being employed). 
In other words, the lack of a well-built safety net in some countries could be behind a large participation 
rate of the elderly. 
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of the population. The evidence from household surveys suggests that in most LAC 
countries the elderly are less likely to experience unemployment (see table 4.4).  
As mentioned above, one of the main problems of analyzing unemployment rates of the 
elderly is that we restrict the analysis to those people in the labor force. Indeed, a large 
share of old people is not clearly out or in the workforce. Their decision to search for a 
job is strongly linked to the availability of suitable jobs. In an extreme, if all the elderly 
sought employment only if they had high chances of obtaining it; their unemployment 
rate would tend towards zero. This could be one of the reasons behind the lower 
unemployment rate of the elderly.13  
In the third panel of table 4.4 unemployment rates between the poor and the non-poor 
elderly are compared. In several countries non-poor elderly unemployment is 
significantly lower than that of the poor. It is important to be cautious about the 
interpretation of these results. Even though they point to the scarce labor opportunities 
for the old poor, the differences could be attributable to the interaction among other 
factors. For instance, many professionals and entrepreneurs that work into later life 
would receive higher income than the poverty line even if they stopped working 
(possibly they have saved enough money during adulthood to not need working to 
survive), but the nature of their work allows them to continue working. In other words, 
we should not conclude that these people are not poor because of working during old 
age. Continuing with the example mentioned above, professionals and entrepreneurs 
usually have more flexible jobs that are not physically demanding, and this could be the 
reason why they choose to keep on working. There is some evidence pointing out that 
elderly labor supply is more sensitive to this kind of non-pecuniary benefits (see for 
example Haider et al., 2001).  
Figure 4.1 illustrates that the elderly and adult people differ considerably in their 
distribution by type of work. The elderly are more likely to be self-employed or 
entrepreneurs than wage earners.  
Table 4.5 reports hourly wages and hours of work for the employed population. As can 
be seen in the first panel, in LAC the elderly tend to work fewer hours. Only in 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, are hours worked by old people not 
significantly different from that of adults aged 50 to 59. The decrease of hours worked 
over the lifetime is drastic in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Uruguay and Haiti, as illustrated in figure 4.2.  
                                                 
13 This explanation is more plausible for the non-poor elderly, especially in countries with strong pension 
systems. As mentioned above, the participation gap between adults and old people shrinks in poor 
countries with fragile social security systems, due in part to the necessity of working for making a decent 
living of many old people. Under this scenario, the elderly are more prone to actively seek for a job 
independently of the availability of suitable jobs. On the other hand, analyzing underemployment, 
together with unemployment, would be necessary to give a full picture of the employability of the elderly 
 17
Hourly wages are higher for the elderly only in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay 
(panel II in table 4.5). In all LAC the elderly are over-represented in the lowest quintile 
of the hourly wage distribution.  
Summarizing, in the majority of the countries the elderly face a lower employment rate, 
and those who are employed tend to work less hours at a lower hourly wage. Likewise, 
they are more likely to be self-employed or entrepreneurs. 
 
Access to housing and basic infrastructure 
Table 4.6 shows statistics regarding housing. It is interesting to notice that, for the most 
part, the elderly are less likely to be tenants, as well as less likely to live in “poor” areas 
(i.e. shantytowns). Only in Brazil and Haiti is the share of old people that reside in 
“poor” areas significantly larger vis-à-vis adults. This is also illustrated in figure 4.3. In 
contrast, the third panel of table 4.6 shows that in several countries, the elderly are more 
likely to live in dwellings constructed using low-quality materials. Such is the case of 
Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Dominican 
Republic and Haiti. The differences are considerably large in Bolivia, where the elderly 
are 15% more likely to live in such dwellings than adults aged 25 to 49. The converse is 
true in the cases of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Jamaica, and particularly Peru.  
The access to basic infrastructure is essential to achieve a minimum standard of living. 
The access to water, sewerage and hygienic restrooms directly affects individual well-
being, and indirectly health status. Clearly, these services play a key role in the 
household hygiene and in the prevention of water and sanitation-related diseases (like 
parasitic diseases). The first panel in table 4.7 reports statistics about access to drinking 
water in the house lot. The elderly seem to have less access to this service in Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Chile, but are in a better position in Nicaragua, Colombia and Venezuela. In 
Peru and El Salvador, the likelihood of having water seems to be related in a non-linear 
fashion to age. Older people have more access than adults aged 25 to 49, but less than 
people aged 50 to 59. In a number of countries, such as Costa Rica and Ecuador, the 
differences between age groups are not statistically significant. The panorama of the 
elderly worsens when considering hygienic restrooms. Older people are more likely to 
live in dwellings without this facility in the cases of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and the Dominican Republic. Only in Nicaragua, 
Uruguay and Venezuela the converse is true. When considering the hardships related to 
sewerage deprivation we find diverse results. In Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Mexico and Jamaica, the elderly are in a worse situation in this dimension. The opposite 
occurs in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The previous paragraphs are illustrative of the importance of analyzing multiple 
dimensions when studying poverty. For instance, the elderly could face a higher 
probability of having drinking water or living in dwellings made of relatively good 
quality materials than other age groups, but at the same time they could be in a worse 
position in terms of hygienic restrooms or income deprivation. These kinds of 
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phenomena are a manifestation of the complexity of measuring welfare, and point out 
the usefulness of considering each attribute in a separate way, together with aggregate 
measures of well-being. 
 
Education  
When analyzing the socioeconomic situation of the elderly, education becomes a key 
issue. Besides enhancing the likelihood of having a well-paid job (and therefore 
reducing the chances of suffering from income deprivation), education affects many 
aspects of life, being a fundamental attribute of individual welfare. For instance, literacy 
and numeric skills are used in many daily activities, like buying food. Among other 
scourges, illiterate people suffer from social exclusion and face serious difficulties in 
accessing to information. 
Table 4.8 reports statistics on literacy rates. For all countries the percentage of older 
people with literacy skills is smaller than that of adults aged 25 to 59. The gap tends to 
increase when examining rural areas (panel III in table 4.8). When comparing with 
people aged 25 to 49, the differences are considerably large in Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, the poorest countries in the sample. Figure 4.4 suggests a positive 
correlation between this literacy gap (in absolute terms) and the level of national 
poverty. In general, the poorer the country, the larger the elderly relative disadvantage 
in this basic skill. This fact has a positive side, since it reveals the advance of literacy 
for the younger generations in the poorest countries. The negative side is that the 
increase in literacy has not included older people, who are left behind regarding this 
basic skill.  
In table 4.9 individuals are classified according to years of formal education in three 
groups: unskilled (at most 8 years), semi-skilled (9 to 13 years) and skilled (more than 
13 years). In countries like the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua, around 90% or more of older people are unskilled. In 
all the countries, the likelihood of being in this group is larger for old people, and is 
around twice as large as that of adults in countries with relatively low levels of poverty 
like Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (see panel III in table 4.9). A slight negative 
correlation between national poverty and the ratio between the percentage of unskilled 
old age and the percentage of unskilled adults is shown in figure 4.5. This suggests that, 
in contrast to the changes in literacy discussed above, the education upgrading process 
has been more intensive in the less poor countries in the sample. 
 
An aggregate indicator  
Once we move beyond the scope of income poverty, we face conceptual issues related 
to the aggregation of the multiple attributes of well-being. A multidimensional approach 
discards prices as weights and requires the specification of a welfare function which 
performs this role. This step would lead to determine which attributes, if any, are 
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substitutes. For instance, deprivation in health may be compensated by a sufficiently 
high level in another dimension (e.g. education).14 Specifying a welfare function and 
setting the relevant thresholds allows us to rank people according to their level of 
welfare and to identify the poor.15  
To deal implicitly with this issue, an aggregate indicator of deprivation (usually labeled 
as NBI – Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas) is frequently employed by researchers and 
National Statistics Offices in Latin America. A particular aspect concerning aggregate 
indicators is that insufficient levels of welfare in one attribute cannot be compensated 
by improving (even substantially) the other dimensions, i.e. there is no substitutability. 
A person is considered poor under this approach by not fulfilling at least one of the 
selected conditions.  
We construct an aggregate indicator of deprivation according to the following criteria:16 
(i) more than 4 persons per room, (ii) the household lives in “poor” areas (iii) the 
dwelling is made of low-quality materials, (iv) the household does not have access to 
water in the lot, (v) the dwelling does not have an hygienic restroom, (vi) the household 
head does not have a primary school degree (vii) the household head does not have a 
high-school degree, and there are more than 4 household members for each income 
earner. As mentioned above, all persons in a household are considered poor if they meet 
at least one of these conditions.   
The results obtained are shown in table 4.10. It is important to take into consideration 
that in some countries the information in the household surveys does not allow to 
implement the seven criteria listed above. For that reason this aggregate indicator 
should not be compared across countries. Our main objective, however, is to compare 
this measure within countries and across age groups. In most cases the elderly are more 
prone to live in poor households according to the aggregate indicator. The more 
substantial differences are observed in Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and 
Panama. Table 4.11 examines each condition included in this indicator.17 The result of 
the disadvantage of the elderly regarding the aggregate indicator is mainly due to 
differences in terms of education and house material. On the other hand, the indicators 
related to a large household size (rooms per capita, dependency rates) tend to reduce the 
gap between the elderly and the rest regarding this aggregate measure of deprivation.  
 
                                                 
14  See Thorbecke (2005) for a discussion on this point. 
15 See for instance Perry et al (2006), Bourguignon and Chakravarty(2002) and Thorbecke (2005) for 
more theoretical references about this issue. 
16 See Gasparini (2006) for more details of each criterion. 
17 For each criterion we report the difference between the proportion of older people who live in 
households not meeting this criterion and that of adult population. 
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Box 4.1 Hunger and the elderly  
Some countries measure food insecurity using an indirect approach. They estimate the 
cost of a basic food bundle and then identify the household that cannot afford it. A 
different approach consists in directly asking about alimentary deprivation. In particular, 
the United States Department of Agriculture developed a methodology that allows 
establishing whether a household have enough food according to the perception of the 
adult members.18 If the converse is true, it is said that the household suffer from hunger.  
In order to compare the elderly’s chance of suffering from hunger vis-à-vis that of the 
rest of the population, we employed this methodology and the component of food 
security included in a special survey of Argentina.19 This module included 10 questions 
to assess if the household faces difficulties in satisfying its food needs. The answers to 
these questions were employed to construct a hunger indicator.20 In table B4.1, 
household are classified according to the age of the head. As it can be seen in the first 
panel of this table, there are not statistically significant differences in the likelihood of 
having hunger between different age groups.  
Colombia’s ECV allows constructing a more rudimentary indicator of hunger21, but 
with the advantage of having a much larger sample size than in Argentina.22 The second 
panel of table B4.1 shows that the results are similar to those found for Argentina, 
except for the rural areas. Among rural people, households where the head is old are 
more likely to suffer from hunger than those where the head is aged 25 to 49. 
 
Health 
Health is an important dimension of poverty. Poor people usually suffer from precarious 
sanitary conditions. This not only directly affects welfare but also interacts with many 
related aspects. For example, bad health reduces productivity and diminishes the ability 
to manage knowledge.23 In order to analyze the health dimension, we use a sample of 
surveys (in most cases Living Standard Measurement Surveys) which include questions 
on several health issues for a group of countries: Argentina (Encuesta de Condiciones 
de Vida, 2001), Bolivia (Encuesta Continua de Hogares, 2003-2004), Colombia 
                                                 
18 Hamilton et al (1997). The details about this methodology can be found in  Hamilton et al. (1997) and 
Nord y Bickel (2002)  
19  Encuesta de Impacto Social de la Crisis en Argentina (ISCA), 2002 
20 For technical details see Haimovich and Winkler (2005) 
21 This survey asks if a member of the household had nothing to eat (at least during a whole day of the 
previous week) due to economic reasons. This question is similar to one of the ten questions employed to 
construct the hunger indicator of Argentina.  
22 The sample size of Colombia’s ECV is around ten times larger than that of the ISCA survey 
 
 
23 World Bank (2006). Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuous and Vicious Circles 
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(Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, 2003), Guatemala (Encuesta Nacional sobre 
Condiciones de Vida, 2000), El Salvador (Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples, 
2004), Nicaragua (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida, 
2001), Panama (Encuestas de Niveles de Vida, 2003) and Peru (Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares, 2003).   
Health issues are particularly interesting when studying old people’s well-being. Aging 
is strongly linked to health deterioration. Other things being the same, the health of 
older people is expected to be worse than that of the rest of the population. We illustrate 
this idea with a subjective measure of health status. Colombia’s ECV asks individuals 
about self-perception of health. Figure 4.6 shows that the proportion of people who 
consider themselves to be healthy drastically falls with age. Whereas around 80% of the 
population aged 5 to 30 have a positive self-perception, this share drops to values close 
to 30% for people older than 70. Naturally, this phenomenon is also reflected in the 
likelihood of being ill.24 Table 4.12 shows that in all the countries this likelihood is 
significantly higher for the elderly. The differences are particularly large in Bolivia and 
Nicaragua. In the latter, whereas 38% of people aged 25 to 49 fell ill during the previous 
month, this percentage reaches 73% for older people.  
In Bolivia, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru, among those who are ill, the likelihood of 
visiting a doctor is higher for the elderly. This could be due to differences in the severity 
of the illness or to different attitudes toward health care, but it does not seem to be due 
to a larger capacity to afford medical attention. Only in Bolivia, people between 25 and 
59 years old are more likely to face economic barriers to visit a doctor (see panel III in 
table 4.12). In Panama, Peru, Guatemala and El Salvador the converse is true, and in the 
cases of Nicaragua and Argentina there are not significant differences in this 
likelihood.25  
Other relevant aspect is access to health insurance. Table 4.13 shows that the panorama 
regarding this issue is ambiguous. In Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua older 
people are in a worse situation, with lower access to health insurance. The opposite 
happens in the rest of the countries. 
 
5. The role of the pension systems  
In this section we extend the analysis of the relationship between old age poverty and  
the pension systems, started in section 3, by presenting evidence on the coverage of 
pensions in LAC, and carrying out microsimulations in order to assess the potential 
effectiveness of different pension schemes to reduce poverty. 
 
                                                 
24 The illness condition is referred to the month previous to the field work of the survey. 
25 However, in Argentina the elderly are much more likely (10 percentage points) to face economic 
barriers for getting medicines. 
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Coverage  
Most LAC countries have contributory pension systems. In these kinds of employment-
based schemes only people with a stable formal job have access to a pension upon 
retirement. Most Latin-Americans, however, are self-employed or salaried workers in 
small, precarious firms without a signed contract in compliance with labor regulations, 
and without access to social security. The evidence suggests that there are no signs of a 
reduction in the high levels of labor informality in the region in the last 15 years 
(Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2007; ECLAC, 2006). In fact, in several countries labor 
informality has increased since the early 1990s.   
In table 5.1 and figure 5.1 we present the share of people receiving income from 
pensions. As expected, the coverage of the pension system in LAC is very low: in 13 
out of 19 countries in the sample the share of the elderly receiving income from 
pensions is lower than 20%. As mentioned earlier, Southern Cone countries have 
relatively well-developed pension systems, with coverage for the elderly ranging from 
around 55% in Argentina and Chile to 78% in Brazil and Uruguay. The other two 
countries with coverage higher than 20% are Costa Rica and Panama, with levels near 
40%.  
The picture does not look very different if we consider only urban areas. Table 5.2 and 
figure 5.2 show that in most countries the coverage of pension systems in cities is 
higher than in the whole country, but the difference does not seem large. The main 
exception to this conclusion is Panama. The level of urban coverage in this country is 
similar to Argentina, with more than 50%.  
The case of Brazil stands out from the rural statistics in table 5.3 and figure 5.3. In rural 
Brazil the share of elderly receiving income from pensions is 85%. This high level of 
coverage is due to the implementation of a non-contributory program geographically 
targeted: the Brazilian rural pension program, which has been very important in 
reducing poverty in the poorest rural areas of that South American country. The results 
achieved in rural Brazil highlight the potential effectiveness of non-contributory 
mechanisms in reducing poverty, especially in countries with a large proportion of their 
population excluded from formal labor markets, and thus unable to have access 
contributory pension systems. Of course, the possibility to implement non-contributory 
mechanisms depends on fiscal revenues, usually scarce in LAC countries.    
All the results shown above are not significantly different if we restrict the analysis to 
inactive elderly people or define the elderly as those older than 65. In fact, both changes 
reinforce the advantage in favor of Southern Cone countries, with the share of covered 
people changing slightly in the remaining countries. The exception is Argentina: in this 
country 76% of inactive people older than 65 receive income from pensions, while only 
56% of people older than 60 receive income from pensions.  
So far we have analyzed the access to pensions by the elderly. We now turn to adult 
people in the labor force to assess its potential access to the pension system in the 
future. Table 5.4 presents the percentage of salaried workers with the right to receive a 
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pension when retired. Unfortunately, information on the access to the pension system in 
the LAC household surveys is either restricted to wage earners or not available 
altogether.  
In 8 out of 13 countries less than half of the workers have the right to receive a pension 
upon retirement. If we added to this scenario the fact that labor informality is surely 
very high among the self-employed, and that unemployment rates are high in many 
LAC countries, we would end up with a very disappointing result: most participants in 
the labor force are not included in the contributory pension systems of LAC, and 
therefore they do not have the right to perceive a pension in the future. 
The situation regarding labor informality is not homogeneous across countries. In Chile 
almost 90% of salaried workers pay social protection contributions, and in Uruguay 3 
out of 4 salaried workers contribute to the pension system. There are three countries 
with intermediate levels of informality: Venezuela, Argentina and El Salvador. In the 
remaining countries the share of formal salaried workers is less than 50%. The case of 
Brazil is interesting: while only 20% of rural salaried workers pay social protection 
contributions, it was shown above that 85% of rural people older than 60 receive 
income from pensions. This highlights the importance of the non-contributory 
mechanism in Brazil.  
In the four Southern Cone countries with the lowest overall rates of labor informality, 
the share of workers older than 60 who are formal is similar to the national average. On 
the contrary, in almost all the remaining countries the percentage of informal salaried 
workers older than 60 is significantly higher than the national mean.      
Finally, table 5.4 informs that a very low proportion of salaried rural workers have the 
right to pensions when retired, with the exception of Chile. 
 
Impact of pension on poverty  
In section 3 we provide evidence on poverty in LAC countries. By showing poverty 
rates by age groups, we conclude that poverty rates are lower for the elderly than for 
other age groups in countries with well-developed pension systems. On the other hand, 
in countries with weak social security systems there is not much difference between old-
age poverty rates and overall poverty rates. In this section, we take a step into the 
analysis of the impact of pension systems over poverty by computing poverty rates 
excluding pensions from total household income. This contrafactual exercise has an 
implicit assumption: if the pension system disappeared, older people incomes would be 
reduced by the amount of the pensions they are now receiving. The assumption is 
strong, since it is likely that without pensions, some older people would receive 
transfers from relatives, friends or NGOs, or decide re-enter the labor market. These 
behavioral changes would be even more important in the long run, when adult people 
can foresee the absence of a social security net when old. Given these caveats, the 
simulations of this section should be viewed as just the direct short-run effects of the 
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pension system on poverty. A deeper analysis requires a behavioral model that is 
beyond the scope of this document.  
 In table 5.5 we show the results of this simple exercise. The evidence supports the 
conclusions of section 3: pension systems in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have 
an important role in alleviating old-age poverty (given the assumptions of this exercise). 
In these four countries, those with overall poverty rates markedly higher than old-age 
poverty, the existence of pension systems with high coverage helps to eradicate poverty 
almost completely among the elderly. The strongest impact occurs in Brazil: while only 
3.7% of Brazilians older than 60 are poor, 47.9% of them would be poor without 
pensions (keeping all the rest constant). The situation is very similar in Argentina: while 
poverty among the elderly is low (4.5%), the situation would be different without social 
security: old-age poverty would reach a level of 39.5%. In Chile and Uruguay, two 
countries where poverty among the elderly is very low, pension systems contribute to 
decrease old-age poverty in almost 20 points. In the remaining countries, with the 
exception of Mexico and Venezuela, the impact of pension systems on poverty is low. 
This is an expected result, considering the very low coverage of pension systems in 
these countries. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 display the results of the same exercise for urban and 
rural areas, separately. The main finding is not surprising: the impact of the pension 
systems on poverty is higher in the cities than in the countryside, due to the higher 
coverage of pension systems in urban areas. The results presented in Tables 5.5 to 5.7 
are robust to the definition of the elderly. 
 
Simulating the impact of a universal pension system on poverty 
Policies traditionally applied to fight poverty are usually designed with the intention of 
improving the productivity of poor people. The aim of specific policies like training and 
educational programs is to strengthen their endowment of human capital, augmenting 
their capacity to find employment and generate income. But, as we have already 
commented in section 4, most elderly people just do not participate in the labor market, 
and hence those policies may result ineffective to fight old-age poverty.  
A powerful instrument to alleviate poverty among the elderly is to transfer real income 
to them, specifically through pension systems. In order to analyze the impact of this 
kind of policy on old-age poverty, we carry out microsimulation exercises following 
Bourguignon et al. (2006), who simulate the introduction of minimum pension systems 
in all LAC countries.  
The simplest minimum pension scheme to fight old-age poverty is a universal transfer 
equal to the poverty line granted to all people older than 60 (or 65). This scheme covers 
all the elderly unconditionally, which makes it administratively very simple, but at the 
same time very costly, as it transfers income to all the elderly. One way to reduce costs 
without increasing administrative costs too much, is by using information from pension 
systems to subtract from the transfer the income that some of the elderly perceive as 
pension. A further refinement to reduce direct costs would be to restrict the transfer to 
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the poor elderly. Obviously, this restriction imposes indirect costs in terms of 
identifying poor people. The two minimum pension systems considered in our 
microsimulations (similar to Bourguignon et al, 2006) are the following:   
Microsimulation 1: a transfer equal to the poverty line net from income perceived as 
pension, granted to all the elderly: 
T = max (0, z – yp) if age>59 (or 64) 
where T = transfer, z = poverty line, yp = income perceived as a pension 
Microsimulation 2: a transfer equal to the poverty line net from income perceived as a 
pension to all the poor elderly: 
T = max (0, z – yp) if age>59 (or 64) and y<z 
where y = household per capita income.  
Notice that the impact on poverty of these two schemes is the same, since poor elderly 
receive the same transfer under both mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, the difference 
between them is the amount of money required by each one. Direct costs are lower in 
the second scheme, in which only poor people aged more than 60 receive the transfer.  
Following Bourguignon et al. (2006) we present results under different scenarios 
regarding the way in which the transfer is shared within the family, and the possible 
incentive effects of the transfer, particularly work incentives. The scenarios analyzed 
are the following: 
• Benchmark: the transfer is shared within the household. Each member will have 
an income equal to (Y+P)/n, where Y = total household income, P = minimum 
pension and n = total family members. 
• Altruism: the older person gives away half of his/her pension to the rest of the 
members of the family. The older person will have an income equal to Y/n + 
P/2n, and the other members equal to Y/n + P/2n + P/2(n-1).  
• Egoism: the old person keeps his/her pension to him/herself. In this case her/his 
income is Y/n + P, while the other members of the family receive only Y/n. 
• Labor Supply: we suppose that because of the minimum pension the labor 
supply of the other members of the family decrease. We assume a reduction of 
labor income equal to the 50% of the pension.  
 
In table 5.8 we present the poverty headcounts resulting from both microsimulations, 
under the four scenarios. The first panel shows results for all the population, for the 
elderly and people younger than 60, while the second panel breaks down the latter 
group into children, young and adults.  
The impact on the overall poverty rate of the minimum pension system proposed, under 
any scenario, is low. This result is not surprising, since these schemes are aimed to 
reduce old-age poverty, instead of overall poverty. More important for us is to analyze 
what happens with old-age poverty. As expected, the greatest impact on old-age poverty 
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takes place for countries with low coverage of pension systems. In countries with well-
developed pension systems most of the elderly are already receiving income from 
pensions: the extension of the current schemes simulated in the exercise only affects a 
limited number of older people. Additionally, it is probable that people receiving the 
transfer in the exercise belong to the poorest families of the population of these 
countries, so the amount of the transfer given to the elderly would be usually not 
enough to allow the family to escape poverty. 26  
As expected, the greatest impact on old-age poverty occurs under “egoism”, i.e. when 
the older member of the family keeps the pension for him/herself. In this case the 
poverty rates for younger than 60 are not modified. An opposite conclusion is obtained 
under “altruism”: the poverty rate of the elderly does not fall as much as without 
“altruism”, but the other age groups experience a larger decrease in their poverty rates. 
However, in practice the poverty reduction in these groups turns to be very small. In the 
“benchmark” case, the results are intermediate between “egoism” and “altruism”: 
poverty rates fall for all age groups, but old-age poverty does not decrease as much as 
under “egoism”, and poverty rates of the non-elderly do not decrease as much as under 
“altruism”. 
In the “labor supply” case the poverty rates of all age groups decrease less than under 
the “benchmark” case. However, the welfare of each group may increase, because of 
lower rates of labor force participation (and hence more leisure).  
The fact that old-age poverty is not eradicated completely in spite of the minimum 
pension reflects that the pension is shared among all household members. Even under 
“egoism”, poverty for the elderly is not eliminated. This is explained by the fact that we 
have supposed that the elderly keeps for him/herself only the pension received from the 
new scheme, but they still share the pension received before the implementation of the 
universal pension system. Table 5.9 shows that these conclusions are robust to the 
definition of the elderly. 
In order to assess the feasibility of the implementation of these kinds of universal 
minimum pension systems, we calculate the costs in terms of household per capita 
income of each scheme. Table 5.10 shows the results of these calculations. As expected, 
the program with the lowest cost is that in which only the poor elderly receive the 
transfer. The cost of both programs is smaller in countries with well-developed pension 
systems. In fact, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay the cost of the programs is 
negligible.  
 
                                                 
26 People excluded from the contributory pension system in these countries are normally those who do not 
have a stable job along their lifetime. These people are also very poor in these countries. 
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6. Some microsimulation exercises  
One of the main social targets for societies all around the world is to reduce poverty. 
For instance, the first goal of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals is 
aimed at halving the proportion of poor people in each country between 1990 and 2015. 
Although poverty-reduction targets are usually set for country aggregates, it is equally 
important to analyze them for certain relevant groups. In this section we use 
microsimulation techniques in order to analyze how several contrafactual scenarios may 
influence the likelihood of reaching certain poverty-reduction goals by the elderly. 
Specifically, we carry a microsimulation exercise that illustrates the combinations of 
neutral growth and redistribution needed to attain certain poverty-reduction targets for 
the elderly.  
The roads leading to sustainable reduction of poverty are subject of great debate. In this 
section we simplify the issue by thinking poverty reduction as the result of either neutral 
per capita income growth, or redistributive policies, or a combination of both. Of course 
reality is much more complex: there might be no policy instrument that increase 
productivity proportionally for all the population, while redistributive policies may take 
a significant toll on efficiency, and hence on incomes. However, it is still illustrative to 
know what is the effort in terms of neutral economic growth and simple non-
distortionary redistributive policies to attain a certain poverty target. This information is 
useful at least to have an idea of the “distance” of the country from the poverty target in 
terms of growth and redistribution. In this section we compute isopoverty curves that 
measure the effort in terms of income redistribution as well as economic growth, that 
would allow reducing poverty for the elderly. We first discuss the methodology and 
then show the results. 
We compute isopoverty curves, that is, combinations of neutral growth rates and simple 
redistributive policies that are capable of attaining a given poverty objective.27 In our 
case the objective is reducing poverty by a half for the older population (+60) of a 
country. The starting point in each country is the latest income distribution available. In 
the simulations the country reaches the poverty-reduction goal for the elderly in the year 
2015. We model growth by multiplying household income by a constant, thus assuming 
neutral growth. This exercise tell us at what rate the economy should grow, with 
unchanged Lorenz curve, to meet a given poverty target.   
In our isopoverty curves the other way to reduce old-age poverty is by income transfers 
from the non-poor people to the poor elderly. We analyze three types of income 
transfers. The targeted transfers minimize the fiscal cost of a given poverty reduction, 
as measured by the headcount ratio. Only the poor elderly who are closer to the poverty 
line receive the transfer (i.e. those that need a smaller transfer to escape out of poverty), 
and they receive only the minimum amount needed to reach the poverty line. Although 
this policy would be probably undesirable (as the very poorest do not receive transfers), 
                                                 
27 See Gasparini and Cicowiez (2005) for specific details on the computation of these curves.  
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and difficult to implement (as it is perfectly targeted, with transfers depending on 
income), it is theoretically interesting as a lower bound for the fiscal effort to meet the 
poverty goal.  
The other policy extreme in our simulations is a universal transfer to all older people of 
a fixed amount. This is a more realistic case in which the government uses age as the 
only targeting device. This imperfect targeting mechanism implies wasting resources in 
the non-poor elderly, and in excessive transfers to some of the poor who are close to the 
poverty line. Finally, we simulate an intermediate transfer in which only the poor 
elderly receive a transfer of a fixed amount, independent of income. In all redistributive 
policies we assume no efficiency costs (or gains).     
Notice that the growth channel in these microsimulations may also imply some 
redistribution dimension. We assume neutral growth, and then incomes from all sources 
are multiplied by the same factor. In particular, pensions are assumed to grow at the 
same rate as the whole economy, implying more resources into the national pension 
systems. In this scenario of neutral growth, redistribution to the elderly living on 
pensions increases in real terms, although not in terms of the national income. In this 
sense, the redistribution channel implies an additional redistribution effort from the one 
implicit in the growth channel.    
It is important to stress that the simulation of counterfactual income distributions 
through the mechanisms described above is a simple arithmetic exercise (Ferreira and 
Leite, 2003). There is no guarantee that it would be consistent either with (i) household 
behavior, and (ii) a general equilibrium of the markets in the economy. 
 
Results 
In figures 6.1 we present three isopoverty curves for each country corresponding to each 
transfer type. In all cases we take the poverty line of 2 USD a day at PPP, and we use 
household per capita income as the individual well-being measure. The vertical axis 
measures the income tax rate paid by the non-poor (α), while the horizontal axis 
measures the annual growth rate between the year in which the household survey was 
conducted and 2015 (g). Each point in the isopoverty curve corresponds to a 
combination of redistribution policy with a tax rate α and neutral growth at rate g  
needed to halve old age poverty from the base year to 2015.  
The position of an isopoverty curve shows how easy or difficult is for a given country to 
meet the poverty-reduction target: the closer to the origin an isopoverty curve lies, the 
less growth and income transfers are required to reach the target. The isopoverty curves 
are negative sloped, indicating that it is possible to substitute economic growth for 
income redistribution, and convex, indicating that the marginal rate of substitution 
between economic growth and income redistribution is decreasing. The horizontal 
intercept indicates how much economic growth each country needs in order to meet the 
poverty target for older people with no additional income redistribution. The vertical 
intercept informs how much income redistribution, as a share of the non-poor’s total 
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income, each country needs in order to achieve the poverty target with no economic 
growth.  
The curves in figure 6.1 are relatively “flat”, implying that the poverty reduction impact 
of even a small transfer program is equivalent to that of many percentage points in 
accumulated economic growth. For instance, in the case of El Salvador, an annual 
growth rate of almost 5% between 2004 and 2015 is equal, in terms of old age poverty 
reduction, to an income transfer of less than one point (0.73%) of the non-poor 
individuals’ income to the poor elderly. In general, the curves are flatter for targeted and 
intermediate transfer policies than for universal transfers, as the latter imply a greater 
fiscal effort to achieve the poverty reduction goal. 
Columns (i) and (ii) of table 6.1 show the intercepts of the isopoverty curves with the 
horizontal and vertical axis for every kind of transfer program. Column (iii) shows the 
amount of income transferred from non-poor individuals to older ones as a percentage 
of the country’s total income, assuming no economic growth (g=0).28
For instance, in order to halve old age poverty (as measured with the USD 2 line) 
Mexico would need to transfer 0.54% of non-poor individuals’ total income to the 
elderly poor population under the intermediate scheme, if the economy were not to 
grow between 2004 and 2015. Under a universal scheme the incremental tax rate would 
increase to almost 2%. The same policy-reducing effect could be achieved with no 
income redistribution by an average annual income growth rate of 10.5% between 2004 
and 2015. 
On average, the region needs to grow at annual 6% to cut old age poverty by a half in 
the next 10 years. Although most countries in the region are growing at a fact pace, to 
sustain a growth rate of 6% for a decade seems an ambitious target for such an unstable 
region as Latin America. The redistributive effort seems more modest. Under the 
intermediate type of  transfers, only two Caribbean countries (Haiti and Jamaica) would 
need to implement a tax on the non-poor with a rate higher than 2%. On average the rate 
needed is 0.64%. Even in the universal case, with targeting made only based on age, the 
incremental tax rate would be on average less than 2%. Although this effort seems 
small, the possibility of its implementation in the real world depends on the political 
economy of each country. Efficient redistributive policies have been very difficult to 
implement in Latin America, so even a tax reform of 1% of total income aimed at the 
poor elderly might be unfeasible.  
 
Box 6.1. A simple transfer program 
In this box we calculate the effect at the national level of halving poverty for the elderly 
from their current levels. In order to do that, we simulate the implementation of a 
                                                 
28 Total income is calculated from the household surveys. Notice that this estimation usually differs from 
National Accounts.  
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transfer program that allows half of the elderly poor to leave poverty behind. We 
present results for the poverty headcount ratio using the USD 2 a day at PPP poverty 
line. Figure B6.1 shows the results. 
The reduction in national poverty varies across countries, ranging from more than 3 
percentage points in Jamaica (from 50.5% to 47.3%) to 0.08 percentage points for 
Uruguay (form 6.07% to 5.9%). In most countries the effect of this redistributive policy 
on the national poverty is not significant. On average, the national poverty in the region 
falls by around 1 point. In some countries with large and relatively poorer older 
population, such as Jamaica and Colombia, the impact of this simulated redistributive 
policy is larger. Uruguay, Argentina and Chile also have a large elderly population, but 
composed mostly by non-poor people, which implies a low effect of the simulated 
policy over national poverty (Table B6.1). 
 
7. Demographic transition and poverty 
As discussed in section 2 the Latin American population is ageing. This demographic 
process will undoubtedly have consequences on national poverty. Naturally, estimating 
these consequences is an extremely difficult task that is beyond the aim of this 
document. In this section we take a small step on that direction by carrying out a 
microsimulation exercise. Starting from the latest available household survey in each 
LAC country, we make two basic changes. First we simulate the demographic structure 
of each country in 20 years, considering the population projections by age and sex of 
the United Nations (under the assumption of the medium variant).29 Second, we change 
the educational structure of the population, as we expect that the increase in education 
coverage that the region has experienced will continue in the following 20 years. In this 
section we compute the consequences in terms of income poverty of the simultaneous 
change of the demographic and educational structure of the population of each Latin 
American country.   
As explained, to simulate the demographic structure in 20 years from now we make use 
of the UN population projections. To simulate the future educational structure we make 
the following assumptions. Suppose the latest survey available for a given country is 
that of 2005, and then we make the simulation for year 2025. People older than 45 in 
2025 are those older than 25 now. We assume those people already finished their 
educational process in 2005, and hence in 2025 they will have the same educational 
level as today. We also assume that in 2025 all children finish primary school, and all 
youths (aged 13 to 18) finish secondary school. These two assumptions are not 
important for the simulations since children and youths have zero or low earnings, and 
hence do not affect much the poverty status of the family.  
                                                 
29 For further information see World Population Prospects - The 2004 revision, United Nations-
Department of Economic ad Social Affairs Population Division. 
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People aged 19 to 44 in 2025 are those aged 9 to 24 in 2005. Some of them already 
dropped school. We assume that they will not resume education. For those who have 
not dropped school in 2005, we are uncertain which educational level they will end up 
having in 2025. We then impose a simple upgrading of the observed educational 
structure of those people.   
After simulating the educational levels of people in 2025 we estimate their earnings by 
assuming no changes in the labor market from 2005 to 2015. Of course, this is a strong 
assumption, but it is useful to isolate the effects of the demographic and educational 
changes. Specifically we estimate earnings in 2025 by applying the parameters of two 
Mincer equation for hourly wages and hours of work (estimated with the 2005 data) to 
the characteristics of the population in 2025. If earnings in the simulation change, we 
also change non-labor income proportionally. Finally, we assume no changes in the 
family structure.  
After carrying out this exercise, household incomes change, and hence poverty changes. 
There are two effects that go in different directions. On the one hand, the educational 
upgrading is a poverty-reducing factor. More educated people have higher earnings, and 
hence poverty falls. On the other hand, the ageing process has an ambiguous effect on 
poverty. The demographic transition implies more adult population and more older 
people. The first factor is very likely poverty-reducing as adults have higher earnings 
than youngsters, while the second one is ambiguous, as countries differ in the incomes 
of the elderly relative to the rest of the population.  
Table 7.1 shows the results of the microsimulations for all the countries in our sample. 
The table shows the change in national poverty measured with the USD 2 line using 
three alternative poverty indicators. Poverty drops in all countries (with the exception of 
Uruguay). In some cases the fall is large. For instance, in Nicaragua and El Salvador 
national poverty falls 25 points. Old age poverty also decreases (see table 7.2). The fall 
is particularly noticeable in countries with high current levels of old age poverty.  
In table 7.3 we show the results of a decomposition of the poverty changes described 
above. Given that the microsimulation was based on changes in the demographic and 
educational structure of the population, we can decompose the total change in the 
headcount poverty ratio into these two effects. The educational upgrading of the 
population has an unambiguous poverty-decreasing effect both on national and old age 
poverty. The effect is particularly large in those countries with low attendance rates.  
It interesting to notice that in all economies (except Uruguay) the ageing process 
modeled in this section has a small poverty-decreasing effect. To understand this result 
recall again that the income-age profile has an inverted-U shape: in general individual 
earnings increase from youth to adulthood, and then fall when the person turns old. As 
explained above, on the one hand the demographic transition implies more older people, 
and hence lower incomes and higher poverty, but at the same time it also implies more 
adults instead of children and youths, which implies higher incomes and lower poverty. 
From the evidence of this section it seems that the demographic transition in Latin 
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America is at a point where the latter effect seems larger than the former. The 
difference, however, seems pretty small. Latin America can still take advantage of the 
demographic dynamics. However, it is likely that as the ageing process goes on, the 
increase in the elderly population would become the dominant factor, and hence it will 
imply a new challenge to the aim of reducing poverty in the region.  
 
8. Concluding remarks  
The elderly are around 8% of the LAC population, a fraction that is expected to 
significantly grow in the future as the ageing process goes on. All LAC societies will 
have to face the challenges related to an ageing society in the near future. One of the 
major challenges is eradicating old age poverty. Around a quarter of the elderly 
population in a typical LAC country lives with less than USD 2 a day (PPP). When 
compared to other age groups, the situation widely differs across countries: while in the 
South American countries with relatively well-developed pension systems (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) old age poverty is substantially lower than the national 
mean, in many other LAC countries it is similar or higher than the national average.  
Old age poverty seems to be a less worrisome problem when measured with 
consumption. On the contrary, it looks a more severe problem, vis-à-vis the rest of the 
population, when adjusting incomes for household economies of scale and adult 
equivalents. There is still a long way to go to have precise measures of relative old age 
poverty in LAC.   
The preliminary evidence shown in the paper suggests that there exists a strong negative 
relationship between the development of the pension system and relative old age 
poverty. Cross-country data and various microsimulations suggest that pensions or any 
other mechanism of transferring income to the elderly are essential to keep old age 
poverty low. However, most of LAC elderly do not receive pensions, and most of LAC 
workers are not covered by the social security system, and hence they will not have a 
pension in the future, at least within the contributory regime.  
The cost of protecting the elderly from income poverty does not seem high. Even 
assuming no economic growth, the incremental tax rate on the non-poor to finance a 
transfer to the elderly enough to cut old age poverty by a half is around 1%. Although 
this effort seems small, the possibility of its implementation in the real world depends 
on the political economy of each country. Efficient redistributive policies have been 
very difficult to implement in Latin America, so even a tax reform of 1% of total 
income aimed at the poor elderly might be unfeasible. If there is no room for 
redistributive policies toward the elderly, our simulations suggest that to achieve the 
goal of halving old age poverty LAC economies would need to grow at an annual rate 
of 6% (per capita) for 10 years.  
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Besides the availability of formal arrangements for old age support, the paper suggests 
that factors such as living arrangements, composition of household, and education play 
a role in determining vulnerability to poverty among older persons.  
The study documents that in many countries the elderly are less likely to live in 
precarious areas, like shantytowns, but more likely to live in houses made of precarious 
materials or without sanitation. This diversity points out the usefulness of considering 
each attribute in a separate way, together with aggregate measures of well-being.  
Many poverty-alleviation policies in Latin America are targeted geographically, and use 
the number of children in the household and the size of the dwelling (persons per room) 
as targeting criteria. But as the evidence shown in this paper suggests, in some countries 
the elderly are as poor as the rest of the population (or more), but are less likely to live 
in poor areas, and less likely to share the house with children, a fact that calls for more 
refinements in the design of social policies.      
The demographic transition is underway in Latin America and the Caribbean. Countries 
with well-developed pension systems, where old age poverty is now relatively low, will 
face serious difficulties in maintaining such systems with a decreasing workers/elderly 
ratio. On the other hand, countries with a weak social security net and where old age 
poverty is particularly high, will find hard to reduce national poverty in an ageing 
society.  
The Latin American and Caribbean economies are now in a stage of economic recovery 
and expansion. GDP is growing and poverty is falling in most countries. This paper also 
highlights the fact that countries are still in a stage of the demographic transition where 
the ageing process does not imply a serious obstacle to the aim of reducing poverty. 
LAC societies in general and local governments in particular face a great opportunity to 
make the reforms needed to reduce old age poverty today, and to create the environment 
for old age poverty not to be a serious concern in the future.  
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Table 2.1 
Population, life expectancy and median age  
Africa Asia Europe
 Latin America 
and Caribbean 
 Northern 
America Oceania
Population (millons)
1950 2,519 224 1,396 547 167 172 13
2000 6,086 812 3,676 728 523 315 31
2015 7,219 1,115 4,351 721 634 361 37
2050 9,076 1,937 5,217 653 783 438 48
Life expectancy
   Both
1950 46.6 38.4 41.4 65.6 51.4 68.8 60.4
2000 64.6 49.9 65.7 73.2 70.2 76.7 72.5
2015 67.7 51.8 70.2 75.0 74.0 78.8 76.2
2050 75.1 65.4 77.2 80.6 79.5 82.7 81.2
  Males
1950 45.3 37.1 40.7 62.9 49.7 66.1 58.1
2000 62.3 48.5 63.9 69.0 66.9 73.9 70.0
2015 65.5 51.1 68.1 71.1 70.8 76.1 74.1
2050 72.8 63.8 75.0 77.5 76.4 80.2 78.9
  Females
1950 48.0 39.7 42.2 67.9 53.1 71.9 62.9
2000 67.0 51.3 67.6 77.4 73.6 79.5 75.0
2015 69.9 52.5 72.3 79.0 77.1 81.4 78.3
2050 77.5 67.0 79.5 83.6 82.5 85.2 83.4
Median Age
1950 23.9 19.0 22.0 29.7 20.2 29.8 28.0
2000 26.8 18.4 26.2 37.6 24.4 35.4 31.2
2015 30.4 20.2 30.8 41.8 29.1 37.4 34.5
2050 37.8 27.4 39.9 47.1 39.9 41.5 40.5
World 
Major Area
 
Source: own calculations based on Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, February 
2005. 
Note: Medium fertility and AIDS mortality variant 
 
Table 2.2 
LAC household surveys used in this study 
Country Name of survey Acronym Year Coverage Households Individuals
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua EPH-C 2005 Urban-28 cities 27,511 94,813
Bolivia Encuesta Continua de Hogares- MECOVI ECH 2002 National 5,746 24,933
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 2004 National 122,513 399,342
Chile Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 2003 National 68,153 257,077
Colombia Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2004 National 12,510 50,850
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2004 National 11,366 43,779
Dominican R. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2005 National 7,655 30,038
Ecuador Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo ENEMDU 2003 National 18,959 82,317
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2004 National 16,490 70,558
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos ENEI - 2 2004 National 2,874 10,615
Haiti Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie en Haïti ECVH 2001 National 7,186 33,007
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EPHPM 2005 National 7,318 35,182
Jamaica Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions JSLC 2002 National 5,092 17,535
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 2004 National 22,595 91,738
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida EMNV 2001 National 4,191 22,810
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 2004 National 13,500 52,957
Paraguay Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 2004 National 7,823 34,636
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 2003 National 4,642 21,267
Suriname Expenditure Household Survey EHS 1999 Urban/Paramaribo 410 1,694
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2005 Urban 18,506 54,330
Venezuela  Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 2004 National 37,838 166,320  
Source: SEDLAC 
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Table 2.3 
Population structure by age 
National, urban and rural areas 
60+ 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59 60-64 65-80 80+ 60+ 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59 60-64 65-80 80+ 60+ 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59 60-64 65-80 80+
   Argentina 2005 14.5  85.5  25.5  17.4  42.5   4.0    8.0    2.4  14.5  85.5     25.5  17.4  42.5  4.0    8.0    2.4  
   Bolivia 2002 6.4    93.6  39.6  19.4  34.6   2.0    3.7    0.7  5.1    94.9     37.5  20.9  36.5  1.6    2.9    0.6  8.4    91.6  43.3  16.9  31.5  2.5    5.0    0.9  
   Brazil 2004 9.7    90.3  27.1  19.1  44.1   3.0    5.4    1.2  9.7    90.3     26.1  19.1  45.1  3.0    5.5    1.2  9.9    90.1  32.1  19.1  39.0  3.2    5.4    1.2  
   Chile 2003 11.5  88.5  25.5  17.6  45.4   3.5    6.4    1.6  11.0  89.0     25.4  17.8  45.7  3.4    6.1    1.6  14.5  85.5  25.7  16.4  43.4  4.1    8.2    2.2  
   Colombia 2004 10.3  89.7  30.1  18.6  41.0   3.4    5.6    1.4  10.2  89.8     28.1  19.0  42.7  3.2    5.6    1.4  10.7  89.3  35.4  17.7  36.2  3.9    5.6    1.2  
   Costa Rica 2004 9.0    91.0  28.6  19.9  42.7   2.7    4.9    1.3  9.9    90.1     26.2  19.8  44.3  2.9    5.5    1.4  7.7    92.3  32.1  20.0  40.4  2.4    4.1    1.1  
   Dominican R. 2005 9.2    90.8  31.5  19.5  39.8   2.6    5.1    1.4  8.6    91.4     30.6  19.8  41.0  2.5    4.8    1.3  10.4  89.6  33.2  18.9  37.5  2.9    5.7    1.7  
   Ecuador 2003 9.7    90.3  35.0  19.1  36.3   2.8    5.4    1.5  8.8    91.2     32.7  19.7  38.8  2.6    4.8    1.4  10.6  89.4  37.7  18.3  33.4  2.9    6.0    1.7  
   El Salvador 2004 9.5    90.5  34.0  19.7  36.8   2.6    5.3    1.6  9.9    90.1     31.1  19.3  39.7  2.6    5.6    1.7  8.8    91.2  38.4  20.4  32.4  2.4    5.0    1.4  
   Guatemala 2004 6.2    93.8  41.9  19.7  32.2   2.0    3.4    0.8  7.0    93.0     36.6  20.3  36.2  2.1    3.9    0.9  5.6    94.4  46.3  19.3  28.9  1.9    3.0    0.7  
   Haiti 2001 8.8    91.2  38.6  20.3  32.5   2.5    5.0    1.2  7.1    92.9     35.6  23.3  34.1  2.0    3.9    1.0  10.0  90.0  40.6  18.2  31.5  2.8    5.7    1.3  
   Honduras 2005 7.4    92.6  39.7  21.5  31.5   2.2    4.0    1.1  7.3    92.7     35.0  23.2  34.5  2.2    3.9    1.2  7.4    92.6  43.6  20.0  28.9  2.2    4.2    1.1  
   Jamaica 2002 12.2  87.8  33.2  17.8  36.9   2.8    7.0    2.3  10.9  89.1     31.4  18.3  39.3  2.7    6.5    1.7  13.2  86.8  34.6  17.3  34.9  2.9    7.4    2.8  
   Mexico 2004 8.9    91.1  31.6  18.6  40.9   2.9    4.8    1.2  8.3    91.7     30.3  19.0  42.4  2.7    4.5    1.1  10.7  89.3  35.8  17.3  36.1  3.3    5.7    1.7  
   Nicaragua 2001 6.2    93.8  39.4  21.8  32.5   1.8    3.4    1.0  6.6    93.4     36.3  22.3  34.8  2.0    3.7    1.0  5.7    94.3  43.8  21.3  29.2  1.6    3.1    1.0  
   Panama 2004 9.7    90.3  31.1  17.8  41.4   3.0    5.2    1.5  9.3    90.7     27.8  18.8  44.1  3.0    4.9    1.4  10.5  89.5  36.7  16.1  36.7  3.1    5.8    1.6  
   Paraguay 2004 7.4    92.6  36.3  20.5  35.8   2.4    4.0    1.0  7.4    92.6     33.4  21.2  38.0  2.5    4.0    1.0  7.4    92.6  40.1  19.6  32.9  2.3    4.1    1.0  
   Peru 2003 9.2    90.8  32.2  20.2  38.5   2.6    5.1    1.5  9.1    90.9     27.7  21.7  41.4  2.5    5.1    1.6  9.2    90.8  40.5  17.2  33.1  2.8    5.0    1.5  
   Uruguay 2005 21.2  78.8  22.0  15.0  41.8   4.8    12.6   3.8  21.2  78.8     22.0  15.0  41.8  4.8    12.6  3.8  
   Venezuela 2004 7.2    92.8  32.1  19.4  41.3   2.4    3.9    0.9  7.2    92.8     32.1  19.4  41.3  2.4    3.9    0.9  
National Urban RuralCountry Year
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 2.4 
Population ratios 
60 +/<60 60+/<15 60 +/<60 60+/<15 60 +/<60 60+/<15 60 +/<60 60+/<15 60 +/<60 60+/<15
   Argentina 2005 16.9        56.7        16.9        56.7       19.6        68.5       14.1        45.2       
   Bolivia 2002 6.8          16.0        5.4          13.7       9.1          19.3       7.3          17.8       6.3          14.4       
   Brazil 2004 10.7        35.8        10.7        37.1       10.9        30.7       11.8        40.9       9.6          30.9       
   Chile 2003 13.0        45.1        12.4        43.3       16.9        56.2       14.4        51.1       11.5        39.2       
   Colombia 2004 11.5        34.3        11.4        36.3       11.9        30.1       12.4        38.6       10.6        30.2       
   Costa Rica 2004 9.7          31.0        10.8        37.3       8.2          23.6       10.2        33.2       9.2          28.8       
   Dominican R. 2005 10.1        29.3        9.4          28.0       11.6        31.3       10.4        30.1       9.9          28.4       
   Ecuador 2003 10.7        27.6        9.7          26.9       11.9        28.2       10.7        28.3       10.7        26.9       
   El Salvador 2004 10.5        27.8        11.0        32.0       9.6          22.8       10.8        30.6       10.0        25.1       
   Guatemala 2004 6.6          14.9        7.5          19.1       5.9          12.1       6.5          14.9       6.8          14.8       
   Haiti 2001 9.5          22.4        7.5          19.7       10.8        24.1       10.1        24.1       8.9          20.7       
   Honduras 2005 8.0          18.6        7.9          20.8       8.0          17.0       7.8          19.1       8.1          18.1       
   Jamaica 2002 13.8        36.6        12.2        34.7       15.1        38.0       14.8        40.2       12.9        33.2       
   Mexico 2004 9.8          28.2        9.1          27.5       12.0        30.0       10.0        30.3       9.5          26.1       
   Nicaragua 2001 6.7          15.8        7.1          18.3       6.0          13.0       6.9          16.8       6.4          14.9       
   Panama 2004 10.8        31.4        10.3        33.6       11.7        28.5       11.1        33.4       10.5        29.5       
   Paraguay 2004 8.0          20.4        8.0          22.2       8.0          18.4       8.8          22.9       7.2          18.1       
   Peru 2003 10.1        28.5        10.1        33.0       10.2        22.8       10.4        29.7       9.8          27.3       
   Uruguay 2005 26.9        96.5        26.9        96.5       31.2        117.6     22.3        76.0       
   Venezuela 2004 7.8          22.5        7.8          22.5       8.5          24.6       7.1          20.4       
Gender
Female MaleCountry Year
National Area
Urban Rural
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 2.5 
Female share in population and masculinity index by age 
All >60 <60 All >60 <60
   Argentina 2005 52.6     59.6     51.4     0.90     0.68     0.94     
   Bolivia 2002 50.3     53.6     50.1     0.99     0.87     1.00     
   Brazil 2004 51.3     56.0     50.8     0.95     0.79     0.97     
   Chile 2003 51.3     56.1     50.6     0.95     0.78     0.97     
   Colombia 2004 51.9     55.4     51.5     0.93     0.81     0.94     
   Costa Rica 2004 50.6     52.7     50.4     0.97     0.90     0.98     
   Dominican R. 2005 49.9     51.0     49.8     1.00     0.96     1.01     
   Ecuador 2003 50.1     50.2     50.1     0.99     0.99     1.00     
   El Salvador 2004 52.2     53.9     52.0     0.92     0.85     0.92     
   Guatemala 2004 51.4     50.3     51.5     0.94     0.99     0.94     
   Haiti 2001 51.9     54.9     51.6     0.93     0.82     0.94     
   Honduras 2005 51.5     50.5     51.6     0.94     0.98     0.94     
   Jamaica 2002 50.8     53.8     50.4     0.97     0.86     0.98     
   Mexico 2004 51.9     53.2     51.8     0.93     0.88     0.93     
   Nicaragua 2001 50.8     52.6     50.7     0.97     0.90     0.97     
   Panama 2004 50.0     51.3     49.8     1.00     0.95     1.01     
   Paraguay 2004 49.8     54.4     49.5     1.01     0.84     1.02     
   Peru 2003 50.7     52.2     50.5     0.97     0.92     0.98     
   Uruguay 2005 53.4     59.9     51.6     0.87     0.67     0.94     
   Venezuela 2004 49.8     53.7     49.4     1.01     0.86     1.02     
Share of females Masculinity index
Country Year
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Table 2.6 
Average family size by age 
All 60 + 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59 60-64 65-80 80+ All 60 + 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59 60-64 65-80 80+ All 60 + 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59 60-64 65-80 80+
   Argentina 2005 4.4   2.8   4.7   5.4   4.9   4.1   3.2   2.7   2.5   4.4   2.8   4.7   5.4   4.9   4.1   3.2   2.7   2.5   
   Bolivia 2002 5.5   3.5   5.7   6.1   5.7   5.1   3.8   3.3   3.3   5.4   3.9   5.5   5.9   5.6   5.1   4.2   3.8   3.4   5.7   3.1   6.0   6.4   5.9   5.3   3.4   2.9   3.1   
   Brazil 2004 3.9   2.8   4.1   4.6   4.2   3.7   3.0   2.7   2.8   3.8   2.8   3.9   4.4   4.0   3.6   3.0   2.7   2.8   4.5   3.0   4.7   5.2   4.8   4.2   3.2   2.9   2.9   
   Chile 2003 4.6   3.5   4.7   5.1   4.9   4.4   3.7   3.5   3.3   4.6   3.5   4.7   5.1   4.9   4.4   3.7   3.4   3.2   4.6   3.6   4.8   5.2   5.2   4.5   3.7   3.5   3.5   
   Colombia 2004 4.9   4.0   5.0   5.5   5.1   4.7   4.1   3.9   4.2   4.8   4.1   4.9   5.3   5.0   4.6   4.2   4.0   4.1   5.3   3.9   5.5   6.0   5.6   4.9   4.1   3.7   4.3   
   Costa Rica 2004 4.6   3.4   4.8   5.2   5.0   4.4   3.5   3.3   3.4   4.5   3.4   4.6   5.0   4.9   4.3   3.5   3.3   3.5   4.8   3.4   5.0   5.4   5.2   4.5   3.5   3.4   3.3   
   Dominican R. 2005 4.7   3.6   4.8   5.3   5.0   4.4   3.8   3.5   3.4   4.6   3.6   4.7   5.1   4.9   4.3   3.8   3.5   3.4   4.9   3.6   5.0   5.6   5.2   4.5   3.8   3.5   3.3   
   Ecuador 2003 5.5   3.9   5.6   6.1   5.9   5.1   4.2   3.8   3.7   5.2   4.0   5.3   5.7   5.5   4.9   4.3   3.9   3.8   5.8   3.8   6.0   6.4   6.3   5.4   4.1   3.7   3.5   
   El Salvador 2004 5.3   4.1   5.4   5.9   5.5   4.9   4.3   4.1   4.1   4.9   4.1   5.0   5.5   5.2   4.6   4.2   4.0   4.0   5.8   4.2   5.9   6.3   6.1   5.4   4.5   4.1   4.2   
   Guatemala 2004 6.2   4.5   6.4   6.8   6.4   5.8   4.8   4.3   4.1   5.6   4.1   5.7   6.2   5.7   5.2   4.2   4.0   4.0   6.8   4.8   6.9   7.2   6.9   6.4   5.3   4.7   4.2   
   Haiti 2001 5.6   4.1   5.8   6.3   6.0   5.1   4.3   4.0   3.8   5.6   4.3   5.7   6.2   5.9   5.0   4.5   4.3   4.0   5.7   3.9   5.9   6.4   6.0   5.2   4.3   3.8   3.7   
   Honduras 2005 6.0   4.7   6.1   6.5   6.1   5.5   5.1   4.6   4.5   5.5   4.6   5.6   6.0   5.7   5.1   4.8   4.5   4.6   6.4   4.8   6.5   6.8   6.5   5.9   5.3   4.7   4.5   
   Jamaica 2002 5.2   3.8   5.4   6.1   5.6   4.6   4.1   3.7   3.6   4.8   3.5   5.0   5.7   5.1   4.3   4.0   3.4   3.1   5.5   3.9   5.7   6.4   6.0   4.9   4.2   3.8   3.9   
   Mexico 2004 5.0   3.7   5.1   5.6   5.4   4.7   4.0   3.6   3.5   4.9   3.7   5.0   5.4   5.2   4.6   4.0   3.6   3.6   5.4   3.8   5.6   6.0   5.9   5.0   4.1   3.8   3.2   
   Nicaragua 2001 6.6   5.4   6.7   7.1   6.8   6.1   5.5   5.4   5.0   6.2   5.4   6.3   6.7   6.4   5.8   5.4   5.4   5.2   7.1   5.3   7.2   7.5   7.4   6.6   5.6   5.4   4.8   
   Panama 2004 5.2   3.8   5.4   6.1   5.6   4.7   4.1   3.7   3.7   4.8   3.8   5.0   5.5   5.2   4.5   3.9   3.7   3.8   5.9   3.9   6.1   6.9   6.3   5.2   4.3   3.8   3.5   
   Paraguay 2004 5.6   4.1   5.8   6.4   5.9   5.1   4.3   3.9   4.0   5.3   4.0   5.4   6.0   5.5   4.9   4.3   3.9   4.0   6.1   4.1   6.2   6.8   6.4   5.4   4.4   4.0   4.0   
   Peru 2003 5.5   4.1   5.7   6.0   5.9   5.3   4.5   3.9   4.0   5.4   4.3   5.5   5.8   5.7   5.2   4.7   4.1   4.4   5.8   3.7   6.0   6.4   6.2   5.5   4.2   3.6   3.2   
   Uruguay 2005 3.9   2.5   4.2   5.0   4.5   3.8   2.9   2.4   2.4   3.9   2.5   4.2   5.0   4.5   3.8   2.9   2.4   2.4   
   Venezuela 2004 5.5   4.4   5.6   6.0   5.8   5.1   4.6   4.3   4.4   5.5   4.4   5.6   6.0   5.8   5.1   4.6   4.3   4.4   
RuralYearCountry National Urban
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 2.7 
Number of people living in households with older people 
By age group  
All 60 + <15 15-24 25-59 All 60 + <15 15-24 25-59 All 60 + <15 15-24 25-59
   Argentina 2005 2.68   1.37   0.28   0.26   0.77   2.68   1.37   0.28   0.26   0.77   
   Bolivia 2002 3.45   1.29   0.77   0.52   0.89   3.84   1.26   0.83   0.64   1.16   3.03   1.33   0.70   0.40   0.61   
   Brazil 2004 2.78   1.32   0.28   0.35   0.84   2.73   1.31   0.25   0.33   0.85   3.01   1.35   0.39   0.46   0.81   
   Chile 2003 3.43   1.37   0.50   0.42   1.19   3.43   1.37   0.50   0.42   1.20   3.47   1.40   0.51   0.42   1.18   
   Colombia 2004 3.92   1.34   0.79   0.58   1.33   3.95   1.34   0.71   0.60   1.42   3.84   1.33   1.00   0.54   1.08   
   Costa Rica 2004 3.35   1.37   0.44   0.45   1.09   3.34   1.39   0.39   0.42   1.13   3.38   1.33   0.51   0.51   1.03   
   Dominican R. 2005 3.51   1.29   0.71   0.55   1.00   3.55   1.27   0.68   0.58   1.07   3.43   1.34   0.74   0.51   0.90   
   Ecuador 2003 3.82   1.37   0.86   0.58   1.07   3.93   1.36   0.83   0.61   1.21   3.72   1.38   0.89   0.56   0.95   
   El Salvador 2004 4.06   1.29   0.95   0.68   1.15   3.97   1.30   0.85   0.64   1.21   4.21   1.29   1.12   0.76   1.06   
   Guatemala 2004 4.42   1.32   1.13   0.78   1.22   4.09   1.29   0.89   0.66   1.30   4.80   1.37   1.41   0.92   1.13   
   Haiti 2001 4.02   1.27   1.26   0.76   0.98   4.22   1.24   1.31   0.93   1.13   3.92   1.28   1.24   0.68   0.90   
   Honduras 2005 4.68   1.29   1.41   0.86   1.13   4.52   1.28   1.20   0.87   1.20   4.82   1.30   1.60   0.86   1.07   
   Jamaica 2002 3.65   1.27   0.95   0.56   0.97   3.48   1.24   0.83   0.51   1.04   3.76   1.29   1.03   0.60   0.93   
   Mexico 2004 3.71   1.34   0.67   0.51   1.19   3.68   1.33   0.63   0.50   1.24   3.77   1.38   0.78   0.54   1.07   
   Nicaragua 2001 5.35   1.25   1.60   1.09   1.49   5.37   1.24   1.57   1.07   1.58   5.33   1.27   1.66   1.12   1.35   
   Panama 2004 3.80   1.33   0.79   0.50   1.23   3.77   1.33   0.69   0.49   1.34   3.84   1.32   0.95   0.52   1.08   
   Paraguay 2004 4.04   1.32   0.95   0.69   1.17   4.02   1.31   0.90   0.68   1.24   4.06   1.33   1.01   0.70   1.08   
   Peru 2003 4.06   1.40   0.83   0.69   1.37   4.24   1.41   0.74   0.77   1.63   3.73   1.38   0.99   0.55   0.92   
   Uruguay 2005 2.42   1.37   0.24   0.20   0.64   2.42   1.37   0.24   0.20   0.64   
   Venezuela 2004 4.34   1.28   0.90   0.66   1.52   4.34   1.28   0.90   0.66   1.52   
RuralCountry Year National Urban
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 2.8 
Distribution of household heads by age group  
60 + 0-59 60 + 0-59 60 + 0-59
   Argentina 2005 30.7    69.3    30.7    69.3    
   Bolivia 2002 17.6    82.4    14.5    85.5    22.8    77.2    
   Brazil 2004 20.6    79.4    20.1    79.9    23.2    76.8    
   Chile 2003 26.2    73.8    25.0    75.0    33.9    66.1    
   Colombia 2004 25.5    74.5    24.0    76.0    30.1    69.9    
   Costa Rica 2004 20.8    79.2    21.8    78.2    19.2    80.8    
   Dominican R. 2005 23.6    76.4    22.0    78.0    26.6    73.4    
   Ecuador 2003 25.7    74.3    22.3    77.7    29.8    70.2    
   El Salvador 2004 24.4    75.6    23.5    76.5    26.0    74.0    
   Guatemala 2004 19.3    80.7    18.8    81.2    19.8    80.2    
   Haiti 2001 24.7    75.3    19.4    80.6    28.3    71.7    
   Honduras 2005 22.8    77.2    20.5    79.5    24.9    75.1    
   Jamaica 2002 29.3    70.7    24.6    75.4    33.3    66.7    
   Mexico 2004 22.4    77.6    20.5    79.5    28.6    71.4    
   Nicaragua 2001 20.9    79.1    20.6    79.4    21.5    78.5    
   Panama 2004 24.4    75.6    22.1    77.9    28.6    71.4    
   Paraguay 2004 20.1    79.9    19.1    80.9    21.5    78.5    
   Peru 2003 23.8    76.2    23.2    76.8    25.1    74.9    
   Uruguay 2005 40.8    59.2    40.8    59.2    
   Venezuela 2004 19.5    80.5    19.5    80.5    
Country Year National Urban Rural
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Table 3.1 
Poverty headcount ratio by age 
National Urban Rural
All 60 + 0-59 65+ 0-64 <15 15-24 25-59 All 60 + 0-59 65+ 0-64 <15 15-24 25-59 All 60 + 0-59 65+ 0-64 <15 15-24 25-59
   Argentina 11.6 4.5 12.8 3.6 12.5 20.1 12.1 8.6 11.6 4.5 12.8 3.6 12.5 20.1 12.1 8.6
   Bolivia 43.1 42.1 43.2 43.8 43.1 50.9 37.0 37.7 26.2 19.4 26.6 21.9 26.3 33.7 21.1 22.3 72.6 67.7 73.0 67.9 72.8 76.8 70.7 68.9
   Brazil 17.7 3.7 19.2 2.8 18.8 30.4 17.7 12.9 14.8 3.7 16.0 2.9 15.6 26.0 15.0 10.6 31.9 3.5 35.0 2.6 34.0 47.9 30.9 26.4
   Chile 5.1 1.8 5.6 1.5 5.5 8.2 5.4 4.1 4.7 1.6 5.1 1.3 5.0 7.6 5.0 3.7 8.0 2.9 8.9 2.2 8.7 12.3 8.8 6.8
   Colombia 26.3 30.3 25.8 31.9 25.8 30.9 25.6 21.9 21.0 25.0 20.5 27.8 20.4 24.3 20.5 17.8 40.8 45.3 40.3 44.1 40.6 45.4 40.3 35.2
   Costa Rica 7.0 9.6 6.8 9.8 6.8 9.5 6.2 5.1 4.3 5.6 4.1 6.0 4.1 5.9 4.3 2.9 10.9 16.7 10.4 16.9 10.6 13.8 8.8 8.5
   Dominican R. 14.5 14.7 14.5 15.2 14.4 20.4 12.4 10.8 11.9 12.4 11.8 12.8 11.8 16.7 10.9 8.6 19.3 18.1 19.4 18.9 19.3 26.6 15.1 15.2
   Ecuador 36.3 33.3 36.6 35.8 36.3 45.0 31.9 30.9 27.2 24.6 27.5 27.1 27.2 35.1 25.2 22.2 46.6 41.6 47.2 43.9 46.8 54.8 40.0 42.4
   El Salvador 38.7 31.2 39.5 32.2 39.2 49.2 36.4 32.3 26.5 21.4 27.0 23.0 26.7 35.6 24.6 21.4 56.9 47.6 57.8 47.7 57.5 65.3 52.8 52.0
   Guatemala 34.9 28.0 35.3 29.3 35.1 43.3 27.7 29.6 23.1 20.6 23.2 20.4 23.2 31.1 17.0 18.8 44.7 35.8 45.2 39.1 44.9 51.3 36.9 41.0
   Haiti 78.0 66.4 79.2 66.0 78.8 85.2 76.9 73.4 66.2 60.0 66.7 62.7 66.4 74.0 64.8 60.3 85.7 69.5 87.5 67.6 87.1 91.7 86.5 82.8
   Honduras 38.7 39.2 38.7 40.7 38.6 47.1 31.8 33.0 21.2 22.2 21.1 24.0 21.0 27.2 17.4 17.4 59.6 60.8 59.6 61.9 59.5 66.0 51.9 55.0
   Jamaica 44.8 54.0 43.3 54.1 43.6 48.4 43.1 38.6 47.6 56.4 46.1 56.2 46.5 51.1 46.7 41.6 42.5 52.0 40.8 52.4 41.1 46.2 39.9 35.9
   Mexico 22.0 27.1 21.5 29.5 21.5 28.1 19.4 17.4 15.6 20.4 15.1 22.7 15.1 19.7 13.8 12.4 42.7 44.0 42.5 46.2 42.4 50.7 38.9 36.1
   Nicaragua 48.4 40.1 48.9 40.5 48.7 57.6 44.4 41.3 37.9 33.8 38.2 35.7 38.0 47.1 33.7 31.7 62.7 50.3 63.5 48.2 63.4 69.6 59.7 57.1
   Panama 15.8 12.4 16.2 12.9 16.1 23.5 13.6 11.8 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.7 6.3 9.2 6.0 4.6 32.2 23.9 33.2 24.9 32.8 41.9 28.7 26.5
   Paraguay 26.0 21.0 26.4 22.3 26.2 33.8 22.9 20.7 14.8 14.5 14.8 16.4 14.7 20.7 12.0 11.1 40.6 29.6 41.5 29.9 41.2 48.3 37.9 35.3
   Peru 30.2 21.0 31.1 19.9 30.9 42.4 25.6 24.4 12.4 6.4 13.0 6.5 12.8 18.9 11.8 9.7 62.5 47.2 64.0 44.6 63.7 71.9 56.6 58.1
   Uruguay 6.0 0.8 7.4 0.6 7.1 12.6 7.6 4.6 6.0 0.8 7.4 0.6 7.1 12.6 7.6 4.6
   Venezuela 32.3 28.1 32.6 29.3 32.5 42.3 29.7 26.4 32.3 28.1 32.6 29.3 32.5 42.3 29.7 26.4  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty line=USD 2 a day (PPP) 
 
Table 3.2 
Ratio of poverty headcount ratios by age groups 
Income variable: household per capita income 
National Urban Rural
60 +/<60 60+/<15 60 +/<60 60+/<15 60 +/<60 60+/<15
   Argentina 0.35 0.22 0.35 0.22
   Bolivia 0.97 0.83 0.73 0.57 0.93 0.88
   Brazil 0.19 0.12 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.07
   Chile 0.33 0.22 0.32 0.21 0.33 0.24
   Colombia 1.18 0.98 1.22 1.03 1.13 1.00
   Costa Rica 1.42 1.01 1.37 0.96 1.61 1.21
   Dominican R. 1.01 0.72 1.05 0.74 0.93 0.68
   Ecuador 0.91 0.74 0.90 0.70 0.88 0.76
   El Salvador 0.79 0.64 0.79 0.60 0.82 0.73
   Guatemala 0.79 0.65 0.88 0.66 0.79 0.70
   Haiti 0.84 0.78 0.90 0.81 0.79 0.76
   Honduras 1.01 0.83 1.05 0.82 1.02 0.92
   Jamaica 1.25 1.12 1.22 1.10 1.28 1.13
   Mexico 1.26 0.97 1.35 1.04 1.03 0.87
   Nicaragua 0.82 0.70 0.89 0.72 0.79 0.72
   Panama 0.76 0.53 0.77 0.53 0.72 0.57
   Paraguay 0.80 0.62 0.98 0.70 0.71 0.61
   Peru 0.68 0.50 0.49 0.34 0.74 0.66
   Uruguay 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06
   Venezuela 0.86 0.67 0.86 0.67  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty line=USD 2 a day (PPP) 
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Table 3.3 
Poverty and ratio of poverty headcount ratios by age groups 
Alternative income variables 
                      Household income adjusted for 
Per capita income Adult equivalents Economies of scale              Both
60 + 60+/<60 60 + 60+/<60 60 + 60+/<60 60 + 60+/<60
   Argentina 4.5 0.35 4.7 0.40 4.7 0.39 5.2 0.46
   Bolivia 42.1 0.97 45.8 1.08 44.7 1.04 49.3 1.15
   Brazil 3.7 0.19 4.2 0.23 3.6 0.19 4.2 0.24
   Chile 1.8 0.33 2.0 0.39 1.9 0.36 2.1 0.43
   Colombia 30.3 1.18 31.3 1.23 30.8 1.21 32.0 1.28
   Costa Rica 9.6 1.42 10.5 1.61 11.3 1.70 14.2 2.15
   Dominican R. 14.7 1.01 15.7 1.14 15.4 1.11 16.9 1.26
   Ecuador 33.3 0.91 36.8 1.02 37.5 1.02 40.2 1.12
   El Salvador 31.2 0.79 34.8 0.89 34.7 0.88 37.3 0.95
   Guatemala 28.0 0.79 31.2 0.91 30.7 0.88 34.2 0.99
   Haiti 66.4 0.84 71.1 0.90 72.1 0.90 76.8 0.96
   Honduras 39.2 1.01 41.1 1.08 41.0 1.06 42.4 1.11
   Jamaica 54.0 1.25 55.9 1.30 55.8 1.28 57.7 1.34
   Mexico 27.1 1.26 29.0 1.38 28.7 1.37 31.1 1.52
   Nicaragua 40.1 0.82 43.2 0.89 42.6 0.87 44.7 0.91
   Panama 12.4 0.76 13.7 0.87 13.6 0.86 14.7 0.95
   Paraguay 21.0 0.80 23.6 0.92 23.6 0.91 25.8 1.01
   Peru 21.0 0.68 24.0 0.79 23.7 0.77 26.0 0.85
   Uruguay 0.8 0.10 0.8 0.13 0.8 0.12 0.9 0.16
   Venezuela 28.1 0.86 30.1 0.95 29.7 0.91 31.2 0.98  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty line=USD 2 a day (PPP) 
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Table 3.4 
Ratio of poverty older than 60/younger than 60 
By parameter of economies of scale  
   Argentina    Bolivia    Brazil    Chile    Colombia    Costa Rica   Dominican R   Ecuador    El Salvador    Guatemala
Case 1
1 0.35 0.97 0.19 0.33 1.18 1.42 1.01 0.91 0.79 0.79
0.9 0.36 1.00 0.19 0.34 1.19 1.51 1.04 0.97 0.83 0.82
0.8 0.39 1.04 0.19 0.36 1.21 1.70 1.11 1.02 0.88 0.88
0.7 0.43 1.10 0.20 0.39 1.24 2.05 1.18 1.07 0.92 0.94
0.6 0.47 1.13 0.23 0.45 1.25 2.17 1.26 1.13 0.95 0.99
0.5 0.52 1.16 0.24 0.54 1.27 2.32 1.40 1.17 0.99 1.05
0.4 0.57 1.18 0.27 0.64 1.31 2.36 1.50 1.21 1.02 1.10
0.3 0.67 1.20 0.28 0.78 1.35 2.64 1.56 1.27 1.06 1.19
0.2 0.81 1.23 0.47 0.91 1.37 2.91 1.66 1.32 1.11 1.23
0.1 0.97 1.23 0.65 1.12 1.40 3.13 1.76 1.35 1.14 1.25
0 1.26 1.26 0.75 1.40 1.43 3.32 1.86 1.37 1.16 1.26
Case 2
1 0.40 1.08 0.23 0.39 1.23 1.61 1.14 1.02 0.89 0.91
0.9 0.43 1.10 0.24 0.41 1.25 1.78 1.21 1.07 0.92 0.96
0.8 0.46 1.15 0.24 0.43 1.28 2.15 1.26 1.12 0.95 0.99
0.7 0.49 1.17 0.25 0.48 1.29 2.23 1.31 1.15 0.99 1.05
0.6 0.52 1.19 0.25 0.54 1.30 2.37 1.43 1.19 1.00 1.09
0.5 0.57 1.20 0.26 0.62 1.34 2.50 1.49 1.23 1.03 1.14
0.4 0.64 1.23 0.29 0.74 1.36 2.61 1.57 1.26 1.06 1.20
0.3 0.72 1.25 0.40 0.84 1.37 2.71 1.63 1.31 1.10 1.24
0.2 0.83 1.24 0.49 0.95 1.40 2.99 1.75 1.33 1.13 1.25
0.1 1.00 1.24 0.67 1.16 1.41 3.15 1.80 1.36 1.15 1.26
0 1.26 1.26 0.75 1.40 1.43 3.32 1.86 1.37 1.16 1.26
Case 3
1 0.47 1.15 0.26 0.45 1.31 1.81 1.28 1.13 0.99 1.01
0.9 0.50 1.19 0.26 0.49 1.32 2.10 1.34 1.17 1.01 1.05
0.8 0.52 1.20 0.26 0.51 1.34 2.37 1.41 1.20 1.03 1.10
0.7 0.54 1.22 0.26 0.57 1.34 2.52 1.47 1.23 1.05 1.13
0.6 0.59 1.22 0.27 0.62 1.36 2.52 1.51 1.26 1.06 1.16
0.5 0.62 1.26 0.30 0.71 1.36 2.66 1.60 1.28 1.08 1.20
0.4 0.68 1.27 0.31 0.81 1.38 2.75 1.64 1.31 1.09 1.26
0.3 0.77 1.26 0.42 0.90 1.41 2.87 1.71 1.33 1.12 1.28
0.2 0.88 1.26 0.51 1.02 1.41 3.02 1.77 1.36 1.14 1.27
0.1 1.03 1.25 0.68 1.21 1.42 3.19 1.80 1.37 1.15 1.26
0 1.26 1.26 0.75 1.40 1.43 3.32 1.86 1.37 1.16 1.26
   Haiti    Honduras    Jamaica    Mexico    Nicaragua    Panama    Paraguay    Peru    Uruguay    Venezuela
Case 1
1 0.84 1.01 1.25 1.26 0.82 0.76 0.80 0.68 0.10 0.86
0.9 0.87 1.04 1.26 1.31 0.86 0.82 0.85 0.72 0.11 0.89
0.8 0.90 1.06 1.28 1.37 0.87 0.86 0.91 0.77 0.12 0.91
0.7 0.94 1.08 1.32 1.44 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.81 0.15 0.93
0.6 0.97 1.12 1.36 1.50 0.92 0.99 1.01 0.86 0.17 0.97
0.5 0.99 1.15 1.38 1.57 0.97 1.10 1.10 0.92 0.22 1.00
0.4 1.01 1.17 1.41 1.67 0.99 1.17 1.19 0.98 0.28 1.02
0.3 1.02 1.18 1.43 1.72 1.03 1.26 1.25 0.99 0.40 1.05
0.2 1.03 1.20 1.44 1.78 1.03 1.32 1.31 1.07 0.52 1.09
0.1 1.04 1.23 1.46 1.86 1.06 1.37 1.35 1.11 0.68 1.13
0 1.05 1.25 1.46 1.90 1.09 1.44 1.37 1.16 0.90 1.15
Case 2
1 0.90 1.08 1.30 1.38 0.89 0.87 0.92 0.79 0.13 0.95
0.9 0.92 1.10 1.32 1.45 0.89 0.91 0.95 0.82 0.14 0.96
0.8 0.96 1.11 1.34 1.52 0.91 0.95 1.01 0.85 0.16 0.98
0.7 0.98 1.13 1.37 1.59 0.94 1.01 1.04 0.89 0.18 1.00
0.6 1.00 1.17 1.38 1.63 0.97 1.09 1.11 0.94 0.21 1.03
0.5 1.02 1.18 1.40 1.72 0.98 1.18 1.19 0.97 0.27 1.05
0.4 1.03 1.19 1.42 1.74 1.01 1.25 1.25 1.00 0.36 1.07
0.3 1.04 1.21 1.43 1.79 1.04 1.31 1.30 1.02 0.44 1.08
0.2 1.04 1.22 1.46 1.81 1.05 1.35 1.33 1.08 0.56 1.11
0.1 1.05 1.24 1.46 1.88 1.07 1.39 1.36 1.13 0.71 1.14
0 1.05 1.25 1.46 1.90 1.09 1.44 1.37 1.16 0.90 1.15
Case 3
1 0.94 1.14 1.34 1.54 0.95 0.97 1.03 0.87 0.16 1.03
0.9 0.96 1.14 1.38 1.59 0.96 1.00 1.07 0.92 0.17 1.05
0.8 0.98 1.16 1.40 1.67 0.98 1.04 1.10 0.95 0.20 1.07
0.7 1.00 1.18 1.42 1.70 0.99 1.11 1.16 0.97 0.22 1.08
0.6 1.02 1.20 1.42 1.75 1.01 1.20 1.23 0.99 0.27 1.09
0.5 1.03 1.22 1.42 1.79 1.01 1.24 1.28 1.01 0.32 1.10
0.4 1.04 1.22 1.43 1.80 1.04 1.31 1.30 1.02 0.42 1.11
0.3 1.04 1.24 1.45 1.82 1.05 1.34 1.34 1.06 0.48 1.11
0.2 1.05 1.24 1.46 1.86 1.06 1.37 1.36 1.10 0.59 1.13
0.1 1.05 1.24 1.46 1.89 1.07 1.40 1.37 1.15 0.74 1.16
0 1.05 1.25 1.46 1.90 1.09 1.44 1.37 1.16 0.90 1.15  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Case 1: α1=1, α2=1, Case 2: α1=0.5, α2=0.75, Case 3: α1=0.25, α2=0.50 
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Table 3.5 
Distribution of people older than 60 across quintiles of the income distribution 
Household per capita income Household equivalized income
1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5 Total
   Argentina 8.0 15.1 22.1 28.6 26.3 100.0 11.0 17.9 24.9 24.9 21.4 100.0
   Bolivia 20.3 19.0 16.7 18.0 26.0 100.0 24.4 21.5 14.6 16.7 22.8 100.0
   Brazil 4.5 12.3 25.4 27.8 30.2 100.0 5.5 13.9 29.2 24.9 26.5 100.0
   Chile 10.8 16.8 21.7 25.0 25.8 100.0 13.9 19.2 21.9 22.7 22.2 100.0
   Colombia 24.4 15.5 15.8 21.1 23.2 100.0 26.6 16.4 16.5 19.7 20.8 100.0
   Costa Rica 25.1 16.2 18.9 19.5 20.4 100.0 30.2 18.3 16.3 17.0 18.2 100.0
   Dominican R. 18.9 17.5 20.5 20.5 22.7 100.0 22.4 19.8 19.6 18.9 19.3 100.0
   Ecuador 20.4 16.6 18.2 20.9 23.9 100.0 25.5 17.9 18.0 18.3 20.3 100.0
   El Salvador 15.8 16.5 19.5 22.2 26.0 100.0 18.5 19.7 18.6 20.7 22.5 100.0
   Guatemala 16.3 16.9 14.5 22.1 30.2 100.0 21.4 17.0 15.8 21.1 24.7 100.0
   Haiti 13.1 15.1 17.0 23.9 30.9 100.0 15.8 16.7 19.3 25.3 22.9 100.0
   Honduras 19.8 20.6 18.7 19.1 21.7 100.0 23.6 20.3 19.5 17.1 19.5 100.0
   Jamaica 26.7 23.1 15.9 17.4 16.9 100.0 27.7 25.4 16.3 15.9 14.7 100.0
   Mexico 25.2 19.1 16.2 17.8 21.7 100.0 28.9 19.9 16.9 15.5 18.8 100.0
   Nicaragua 16.2 15.4 20.9 21.1 26.4 100.0 18.4 20.1 17.7 21.3 22.4 100.0
   Panama 15.8 15.4 17.6 22.4 28.8 100.0 19.3 16.0 18.4 20.1 26.2 100.0
   Paraguay 15.4 18.0 20.0 20.9 25.7 100.0 20.6 19.8 18.8 18.1 22.8 100.0
   Peru 12.3 17.3 17.8 19.8 32.7 100.0 16.7 17.9 18.5 18.1 28.8 100.0
   Uruguay 4.9 12.0 21.6 28.9 32.6 100.0 7.0 15.3 23.5 26.8 27.4 100.0
   Venezuela 19.5 14.6 17.0 20.3 28.7 100.0 22.4 15.8 17.4 18.3 26.1 100.0  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 3.6 
Gini coefficient 
Household per capita income Household equivalized income
60 + 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59 60 + 0-59 <15 15-24 25-59
   Argentina 0.452 0.508 0.506 0.480 0.493 0.437 0.478 0.491 0.457 0.464
   Bolivia 0.616 0.599 0.594 0.555 0.606 0.607 0.577 0.581 0.535 0.583
   Brazil 0.538 0.566 0.555 0.529 0.558 0.527 0.545 0.542 0.514 0.540
   Chile 0.542 0.545 0.526 0.525 0.549 0.522 0.527 0.522 0.512 0.529
   Colombia 0.593 0.557 0.544 0.498 0.568 0.565 0.533 0.529 0.475 0.544
   Costa Rica 0.522 0.475 0.462 0.430 0.481 0.516 0.452 0.449 0.413 0.458
   Dominican R. 0.560 0.499 0.473 0.473 0.504 0.539 0.473 0.461 0.453 0.479
   Ecuador 0.538 0.515 0.493 0.484 0.526 0.522 0.489 0.476 0.462 0.500
   El Salvador 0.475 0.484 0.474 0.454 0.485 0.456 0.458 0.458 0.429 0.460
   Guatemala 0.534 0.488 0.454 0.464 0.506 0.512 0.455 0.432 0.435 0.473
   Haiti 0.575 0.592 0.561 0.571 0.611 0.550 0.581 0.554 0.590 0.593
   Honduras 0.591 0.564 0.547 0.531 0.576 0.573 0.541 0.532 0.509 0.554
   Jamaica 0.609 0.597 0.578 0.562 0.598 0.596 0.570 0.563 0.541 0.572
   Mexico 0.601 0.487 0.470 0.441 0.498 0.574 0.461 0.456 0.418 0.472
   Nicaragua 0.507 0.545 0.499 0.525 0.574 0.482 0.515 0.479 0.504 0.539
   Panama 0.549 0.546 0.545 0.507 0.534 0.534 0.519 0.526 0.484 0.510
   Paraguay 0.555 0.551 0.530 0.521 0.561 0.538 0.523 0.510 0.496 0.534
   Peru 0.581 0.505 0.476 0.476 0.511 0.562 0.479 0.460 0.455 0.486
   Uruguay 0.393 0.454 0.449 0.435 0.442 0.374 0.428 0.433 0.416 0.419
   Venezuela 0.454 0.453 0.441 0.423 0.453 0.431 0.424 0.421 0.399 0.424  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 43
 
Table 3.7 
Relative old age poverty in developing countries  
Old age 
relative poverty 
Deaton and Paxson (1997)
Ghana 1.0
Pakistan 1.0
South Africa 1.0
Thailand 1.1
Taiwan 0.8
Ukraine 1.3
Grootaert and Braithwaite (1998)
Bulgaria 1.3
Hungary 0.6
Poland 0.8
Estonia 1.1
Kyrgyz Rep. 1.1
Russia 1.1
Lanjouw et al. (1998)
Bulgaria, 1992 1.0
Russia 0.9
Hungary 0.7
Poland 0.5
Estonia 0.8
Kazakhstan 0.8  
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Table 4.1 
Labor force participation 
All 60+ 25-59 (ii)-(iii) + 60 with + 60 without (v)-(vi)
pensions pensions
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
 
   Argentina 0.67 0.28 0.80 -0.52** 0.10 0.43 -0.33**
   Bolivia 0.80 0.60 0.84 -0.23** 0.32 0.64 -0.31**
   Brazil 0.70 0.31 0.79 -0.48** 0.26 0.45 -0.18**
   Chile 0.63 0.26 0.73 -0.47** 0.17 0.37 -0.21**
   Colombia 0.70 0.36 0.79 -0.43** 0.19 0.39 -0.21**
   Costa Rica 0.64 0.24 0.72 -0.47** 0.13 0.30 -0.17**
   Dominican R. 0.68 0.32 0.77 -0.45** 0.21 0.33 -0.13**
   Ecuador 0.73 0.51 0.79 -0.28** 0.31 0.53 -0.22**
   El Salvador 0.65 0.35 0.73 -0.38** 0.13 0.38 -0.25**
   Guatemala 0.68 0.51 0.72 -0.21** 0.35 0.52 -0.17**
   Haiti 0.71 0.47 0.77 -0.30** 0.09 0.48 -0.39**
   Honduras 0.66 0.47 0.71 -0.24** 0.25 0.48 -0.23**
   Mexico 0.66 0.38 0.72 -0.34** 0.22 0.42 -0.20**
   Nicaragua 0.70 0.42 0.75 -0.33** 0.29 0.44 -0.15**
   Panama 0.66 0.30 0.75 -0.45** 0.15 0.40 -0.25**
   Paraguay 0.77 0.49 0.82 -0.34** 0.24 0.52 -0.28**
   Peru 0.78 0.53 0.84 -0.31**
   Uruguay 0.61 0.18 0.83 -0.64** 0.09 0.53 -0.44**
   Venezuela 0.75 0.38 0.81 -0.44** 0.21 0.41 -0.21**
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4.2 
Marginal probabilities  
Labor force participation of the elderly 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Dominican R. Ecuador El Salvador    Guatemala
Pension payments -0.30048*** -0.39123*** -0.16283*** -0.22587*** -0.20900*** -0.21648*** -0.29439*** -0.30806*** -0.29973***
[0.01394] [0.05694] [0.00726] [0.02286] [0.01374] [0.01901] [0.01909] [0.01635] [0.05821]
Other non-labor income -0.04282*** -0.00716 -0.03580*** -0.09660*** -0.13469*** -0.20679*** -0.13727*** -0.15516*** -0.15051***
[0.01512] [0.03771] [0.00836] [0.02827] [0.01366] [0.02025] [0.01434] [0.01864] [0.03855]
Male 0.24258*** 0.31218*** 0.25013*** 0.39443*** 0.38231*** 0.40207*** 0.42217*** 0.36871*** 0.58625***
[0.01366] [0.03528] [0.00544] [0.02766] [0.01729] [0.02019] [0.01143] [0.01842] [0.02844]
Age -0.02038*** -0.01945*** -0.01738*** -0.01947*** -0.01619*** -0.01667*** -0.02089*** -0.01886*** -0.02574***
[0.00089] [0.00229] [0.00041] [0.00198] [0.00116] [0.00150] [0.00087] [0.00118] [0.00238]
semi-skilled 0.03803** -0.20194*** 0.00467 0.00251 0.05755* 0.13654** -0.03084 -0.03231 -0.08278
[0.01544] [0.07400] [0.01002] [0.03847] [0.03244] [0.05304] [0.02559] [0.03979] [0.07417]
Skilled 0.14732*** 0.04763 0.10453*** 0.15923** 0.07620* 0.24436*** 0.17400*** -0.01523 0.00531
[0.02356] [0.07806] [0.01392] [0.07084] [0.04320] [0.07553] [0.03425] [0.06820] [0.16843]
Married -0.11588*** 0.13823*** -0.04183 -0.06774*** -0.03845 0.00596 0.00262
[0.01418] [0.03699] [0.02946] [0.01718] [0.02340] [0.01984] [0.04125]
Household size 0.00135 -0.01174 0.00322 -0.00416 -0.00724 0.00113 -0.00096 -0.00328 -0.0095
[0.00453] [0.01019] [0.00250] [0.00662] [0.00457] [0.00654] [0.00384] [0.00476] [0.00842]
Number of household members -0.04253*** -0.07309*** -0.01071*** -0.02937* -0.01102 -0.04078*** -0.07019*** -0.06678*** -0.02737
receiving income [0.01022] [0.02440] [0.00374] [0.01544] [0.00881] [0.01290] [0.00767] [0.01142] [0.01675]
Urban -0.21526*** -0.35381*** -0.12943*** 0.00231 -0.07964*** -0.10752*** 0.02173
[0.03570] [0.00816] [0.03988] [0.01401] [0.02407] [0.01334] [0.01869]
Observations 10212 1646 36381 4260 3356 2603 7821 6385 4307
Chi2 1155.33 309.5 5886.97 346.36 762.07 585.05 2059.53 724.07 459.01
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 4.2 (cont.) 
Marginal probabilities  
Labor force participation of the elderly 
   Haiti    Honduras    Mexico    Nicaragua    Panama    Paraguay    Uruguay    Venezuela
Pension payments -0.32529*** -0.10514** -0.54105*** -0.29185*** -0.28399*** -0.24522*** -0.30842*** -0.32535***
[0.07702] [0.04463] [0.02274] [0.06259] [0.01509] [0.04757] [0.01288] [0.01021]
Other non-labor income -0.09823*** 0.00058 -0.30508*** -0.02567 -0.09202*** -0.09684*** -0.05214*** -0.14274***
[0.02444] [0.04301] [0.02957] [0.04494] [0.01497] [0.03208] [0.00602] [0.01365]
Male 0.23992*** 0.17243*** 0.37258*** 0.32820*** 0.38695*** 0.31990*** 0.14779*** 0.41495***
[0.02372] [0.03464] [0.02913] [0.05642] [0.01494] [0.02577] [0.00794] [0.01161]
Age -0.02033*** -0.01875*** -0.02528*** -0.02069*** -0.01897*** -0.02510*** -0.01432*** -0.02355***
[0.00164] [0.00178] [0.00194] [0.00278] [0.00103] [0.00191] [0.00051] [0.00090]
semi-skilled -0.01729 -0.05725 0.04329 0.112 0.02248 0.06199 0.01944** 0.06220***
[0.06020] [0.04668] [0.04301] [0.10085] [0.02526] [0.05307] [0.00795] [0.02075]
Skilled 0.22580** 0.17917* 0.10421** -0.31198** 0.11640*** 0.22309*** 0.07385*** 0.15279***
[0.10779] [0.10571] [0.04399] [0.14516] [0.04116] [0.06871] [0.01357] [0.03417]
Married 0.02879 -0.04164 -0.06070** 0.05457 -0.03046* 0.04479 -0.08441*** -0.00758
[0.02504] [0.02921] [0.03075] [0.05821] [0.01705] [0.02986] [0.00779] [0.01285]
Household size -0.00138 -0.01382* 0.01257 -0.01369 0.00637 -0.00356 0.01122*** -0.01934***
[0.00562] [0.00729] [0.00797] [0.00917] [0.00550] [0.00689] #¡REF! [0.00307]
Number of household members 0.00294 -0.00831 -0.00886 -0.00022 -0.03687*** -0.04694*** #¡REF! -0.03296***
receiving income [0.01434] [0.01430] [0.01533] [0.02159] [0.00952] [0.01482] #¡REF! [0.00535]
Urban -0.05270** 0.09537*** -0.07365** -0.06094 -0.08206*** -0.27316***
[0.02612] [0.03040] [0.03281] [0.04406] [0.01642] [0.04179]
Observations 2579 952 5421 920 5157 2728 11542 10356
Chi2 389.45 119.1 781.59 134.76 927.44 457.21 2337.71 1897.27
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: The probit estimates include unreported regional dummies Semi-skilled: 9 to 13 years of formal 
education, Skilled: more than 13 years of formal education. 
 
Table 4.3 
Employment  
All 60+ 25-59 All 60+ 25-59 All P. O N.P.O
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
 
   Argentina 0.61 0.26 0.74 -0.48** 0.49 0.22 0.53 -0.31** 0.26 0.22 0.24 -0.02
   Bolivia 0.78 0.60 0.81 -0.21** 0.78 0.70 0.79 -0.10** 0.60 0.70 0.48 0.21**
   Brazil 0.66 0.30 0.74 -0.44** 0.57 0.27 0.59 -0.31** 0.30 0.27 0.29 -0.02
   Chile 0.59 0.25 0.67 -0.42** 0.28 0.11 0.30 -0.19** 0.25 0.11 0.24 -0.13**
   Colombia 0.64 0.35 0.71 -0.36** 0.48 0.25 0.56 -0.31** 0.35 0.25 0.32 -0.06**
   Costa Rica 0.61 0.23 0.68 -0.46** 0.25 0.15 0.29 -0.14** 0.23 0.15 0.22 -0.07**
   Dominican R. 0.60 0.32 0.66 -0.34** 0.33 0.17 0.38 -0.21** 0.32 0.17 0.34 -0.17**
   Ecuador 0.69 0.49 0.74 -0.25** 0.61 0.43 0.66 -0.23** 0.49 0.43 0.51 -0.08**
   El Salvador 0.61 0.32 0.69 -0.37** 0.51 0.31 0.56 -0.25** 0.32 0.31 0.33 -0.02
   Guatemala 0.67 0.50 0.70 -0.20** 0.61 0.45 0.64 -0.18** 0.50 0.45 0.52 -0.07**
   Haiti 0.57 0.43 0.61 -0.18** 0.56 0.43 0.59 -0.17** 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.02
   Honduras 0.65 0.47 0.69 -0.22** 0.56 0.36 0.61 -0.25** 0.47 0.36 0.40 -0.04
   Mexico 0.65 0.37 0.70 -0.33** 0.53 0.37 0.58 -0.21** 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.00
   Nicaragua 0.65 0.40 0.69 -0.30** 0.56 0.34 0.60 -0.25** 0.40 0.34 0.43 -0.09**
   Panama 0.62 0.30 0.70 -0.40** 0.55 0.43 0.57 -0.15** 0.30 0.43 0.28 0.15**
   Paraguay 0.73 0.47 0.78 -0.31** 0.65 0.45 0.69 -0.24** 0.47 0.45 0.48 -0.03
   Peru 0.76 0.52 0.82 -0.30** 0.84 0.75 0.86 -0.11** 0.52 0.75 0.46 0.29**
   Uruguay 0.56 0.17 0.75 -0.58** 0.55 0.31 0.57 -0.26** 0.17 0.31 0.17 0.14**
   Venezuela 0.66 0.34 0.72 -0.38** 0.51 0.25 0.56 -0.32** 0.34 0.25 0.35 -0.10**
All Poor People The elderly
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iii)
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note 1: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note 2: P.O: poor old people, N.P.O: non-poor old people 
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Table 4.4 
Unemployment  
All 60+ 25-59 All 60+ 25-59 All P. O N.P.O
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
 
   Argentina 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.08* 0.08 0.32 0.08 0.25**
   Bolivia 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02** 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
   Brazil 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.04** 0.18 0.10 0.18 -0.09** 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.08**
   Chile 0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.03** 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.03 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.46**
   Colombia 0.10 0.05 0.10 -0.05** 0.20 0.12 0.21 -0.09** 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.08**
   Costa Rica 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.02* 0.31 0.14 0.34 -0.20** 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.12**
   Dominican R. 0.13 0.01 0.14 -0.13** 0.37 0.04 0.40 -0.36** 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04**
   Ecuador 0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.03** 0.09 0.06 0.09 -0.04** 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03**
   El Salvador 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02** 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.07**
   Guatemala 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02* 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04**
   Haiti 0.19 0.09 0.21 -0.12** 0.19 0.08 0.20 -0.12** 0.09 0.08 0.11 -0.02
   Honduras 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02** 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Mexico 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.02** 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02**
   Nicaragua 0.08 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.12 0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.03
   Panama 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.04** 0.09 0.03 0.10 -0.07** 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
   Paraguay 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.03** 0.08 0.04 0.08 -0.05** 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01
   Peru 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02*
   Uruguay 0.09 0.05 0.09 -0.04** 0.23 0.15 0.24 -0.08 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.10**
   Venezuela 0.11 0.10 0.12 -0.02** 0.23 0.19 0.24 -0.04** 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.11**
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iii)
All Poor People The elderly
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note 1: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note 2: P.O: poor old people, N.P.O: non-poor old people 
 
Table 4.5 
Hourly wage and hours of work by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
 
   Argentina 40.6 37.0 40.8 41.1 -3.8** -4.1** 4.0 4.7 4.1 3.8 0.6* 0.9** 23.3 17.1 17.6 19.4 22.7 100.0
   Bolivia 45.4 42.0 44.9 46.1 -2.9** -4.0** 2.0 1.1 2.0 2.1 -0.9** -1.0** 45.3 24.9 12.6 8.2 9.0 100.0
   Brazil 40.7 33.9 40.1 41.6 -6.2** -7.7** 3.7 4.1 4.2 3.6 -0.1 0.6** 28.9 17.3 16.6 15.5 21.7 100.0
   Chile 45.8 44.1 45.7 46.1 -1.6** -2.0** 5.2 6.8 6.3 4.8 0.5* 2.0** 21.6 14.2 17.8 21.7 24.7 100.0
   Colombia 46.2 41.4 45.5 47.0 -4.2** -5.7** 3.1 2.1 3.6 3.2 -1.4** -1.1** 39.2 21.4 16.6 9.5 13.3 100.0
   Costa Rica 46.0 37.6 45.3 46.8 -7.7** -9.2** 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.3 -0.1 0.4 33.6 18.9 15.2 16.5 15.9 100.0
   Dominican R. 42.0 39.2 40.2 42.7 -1.00 -3.5** 3.3 2.9 4.1 3.3 -1.1** -0.4* 31.1 19.1 16.3 16.6 16.8 100.0
   Ecuador 42.3 38.4 42.3 43.1 -3.9** -4.7** 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.3 -0.4** -0.4* 30.3 20.7 16.9 15.8 16.3 100.0
   El Salvador 45.4 42.2 45.0 45.9 -2.8** -3.7** 1.7 1.3 1.9 1.7 -0.6** -0.5** 34.9 22.1 14.3 15.0 13.8 100.0
   Guatemala 41.9 38.3 40.6 42.8 -2.3** -4.5** 2.0 1.6 1.9 2.1 -0.3** -0.5** 34.6 24.8 12.3 14.2 14.1 100.0
   Haiti 37.6 34.1 37.7 38.3 -3.5** -4.2** 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 -0.1 -0.2** 22.7 20.9 20.9 18.8 16.7 100.0
   Honduras 39.8 33.6 39.2 41.1 -5.7** -7.5** 2.6 2.0 3.1 2.6 -1.2** -0.6** 28.8 23.0 17.1 15.7 15.4 100.0
   Jamaica 39.5 36.5 39.8 40.1 -3.3** -3.6** 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.6 -0.5 -0.3 33.7 14.5 12.8 21.5 17.4 100.0
   Mexico
   Nicaragua 47.5 44.5 46.3 48.2 -1.70 -3.7** 1.8 1.5 2.7 1.6 -1.2** -0.1 26.9 21.5 17.8 15.7 18.1 100.0
   Panama 40.8 34.6 40.1 41.7 -5.6** -7.2** 4.6 3.9 5.7 4.5 -1.8** -0.6** 42.1 18.4 12.0 11.7 15.8 100.0
   Paraguay 45.6 40.5 46.0 46.3 -5.5** -5.8** 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.8 0.0 -0.2 33.5 20.7 14.7 13.3 17.8 100.0
   Peru 41.9 35.6 42.3 43.0 -6.7** -7.3** 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.8 -0.3 -0.2 39.5 17.0 14.6 15.4 13.4 100.0
   Uruguay 40.1 36.6 40.1 40.7 -3.5** -4.0** 3.0 3.1 3.3 2.8 -0.2 0.3** 23.7 18.2 17.8 19.0 21.4 100.0
   Venezuela 41.3 38.5 40.7 41.7 -2.2** -3.2** 2.1 1.8 2.2 2.1 -0.3** -0.2** 33.1 19.7 14.6 15.3 17.3 100.0
1 2 3 4 Total5(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv) (ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
Hours of work Hourly wages  1 Quintiles of hourly  wages distribution (+60)  2
 
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Notes: 
1  Hourly wage in main activity at PPP 
2  Distribution of people older than 60 across quintiles of hourly wages distribution 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.6 
Housing by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
   Argentina 0.66 0.83 0.76 0.54 0.07** 0.29**
   Bolivia 0.64 0.86 0.80 0.58 0.05** 0.27** 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.23 -0.05** -0.12** 0.55 0.66 0.59 0.51 0.07** 0.15**
   Brazil 0.70 0.82 0.78 0.65 0.04** 0.18** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00** 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
   Chile 0.65 0.84 0.76 0.54 0.08** 0.30** 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01** 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.03** 0.03**
   Colombia 0.59 0.82 0.64 0.48 0.18** 0.34** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01* -0.01 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.02
   Costa Rica 0.74 0.85 0.85 0.70 0.00 0.16** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.02**
   Dominican R. 0.67 0.86 0.79 0.57 0.07** 0.29** 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.00 -0.03* 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.02* 0.03**
   Ecuador 0.70 0.85 0.81 0.61 0.04** 0.24**
   El Salvador 0.69 0.80 0.79 0.65 0.01 0.15** 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.03** 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.06** 0.05**
   Guatemala 0.78 0.87 0.86 0.74 0.00 0.13** 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.05** 0.06**
   Haiti 0.67 0.84 0.78 0.58 0.07** 0.26** 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.04** 0.06** 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.04* 0.08**
   Honduras 0.71 0.85 0.83 0.66 0.02 0.19** 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.06** 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.04** 0.05**
   Mexico 0.73 0.86 0.84 0.67 0.02** 0.20** 0.32 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.06** 0.05**
   Nicaragua 0.77 0.87 0.88 0.73 -0.01 0.14** 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.01 -0.03* 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.23 -0.01 -0.04*
   Panama
   Paraguay 0.81 0.89 0.89 0.78 0.00 0.11** 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02**
   Peru 0.76 0.89 0.85 0.68 0.04* 0.20** 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.11 -0.01 -0.04** 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.00 -0.11**
   Uruguay 0.64 0.76 0.71 0.50 0.05** 0.27** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
   Venezuela 0.76 0.91 0.84 0.69 0.06** 0.22** 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.00 -0.05** 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.01 -0.03**
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
Share of housing owners Share of dwellings in poor areas Share of dwellings of low-quality materials
(ii)-(iv)(ii)-(iii)(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
 
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 4.7 
Access to services by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
   Argentina
   Bolivia 0.77 0.73 0.77 0.78 -0.04 -0.04** 0.66 0.59 0.67 0.69 -0.08**-0.10** 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.44 0.00 0.08**
   Brazil 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.00* 0.00 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.69 -0.02** 0.00 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.56 -0.01** 0.02**
   Chile 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 -0.01**-0.01** 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.87 -0.03** 0.00 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.81 -0.04**-0.02**
   Colombia 0.76 0.81 0.76 0.74 0.05* 0.07** 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.02 0.02 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.58 -0.02 -0.03
   Costa Rica 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.00 -0.01 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 -0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.25 0.01 0.09**
   Dominican R. 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.71 -0.01 0.01 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.62 -0.05**-0.04** 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.22 -0.01 0.03*
   Ecuador 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.80 -0.04**-0.06** 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.46 -0.03**-0.03**
   El Salvador 0.59 0.61 0.66 0.58 -0.05** 0.02* 0.35 0.31 0.41 0.37 -0.09**-0.06** 0.32 0.28 0.37 0.34 -0.09**-0.06**
   Guatemala 0.66 0.67 0.71 0.67 -0.04** 0.00 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.44 -0.04* 0.02 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.37 -0.01 0.02
   Haiti 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
   Honduras 0.35 0.33 0.39 0.35 -0.06** -0.02 0.44 0.39 0.47 0.44 -0.08**-0.06** 0.34 0.29 0.35 0.36 -0.06**-0.06**
   Mexico 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.88 -0.01 0.01 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.65 -0.05** -0.01 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.71 -0.02* 0.00
   Nicaragua 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.02 0.04* 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.01 0.04** 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.05**
   Panama
   Paraguay 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.72 -0.02 -0.05** 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.62 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03**
   Peru 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.57 -0.04* 0.07** 0.58 0.57 0.65 0.56 -0.08** 0.01 0.48 0.52 0.58 0.44 -0.06** 0.08**
   Uruguay 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.01 0.03** 0.64 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.03** 0.06**
   Venezuela 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.00 0.01** 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.89 -0.01* 0.02** 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.70 -0.01 0.06**
Water Hygienic restrooms Sewerage
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv) (ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv) (ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.8 
Literacy by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
   Argentina 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 -0.02** -0.02** 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 -0.02** -0.02**
   Bolivia 0.82 0.57 0.76 0.90 -0.19** -0.33** 0.92 0.75 0.88 0.96 -0.13** -0.21** 0.66 0.38 0.57 0.77 -0.19** -0.39**
   Brazil 0.86 0.68 0.82 0.91 -0.14** -0.23** 0.89 0.73 0.87 0.94 -0.14** -0.21** 0.67 0.45 0.59 0.77 -0.13** -0.31**
   Chile 0.95 0.87 0.94 0.98 -0.07** -0.11** 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.98 -0.05** -0.08** 0.85 0.67 0.82 0.94 -0.15** -0.26**
   Colombia 0.91 0.77 0.89 0.95 -0.12** -0.18** 0.95 0.85 0.94 0.97 -0.08** -0.12** 0.79 0.56 0.74 0.88 -0.18** -0.32**
   Costa Rica 0.91 0.75 0.89 0.96 -0.14** -0.20** 0.94 0.83 0.94 0.97 -0.10** -0.14** 0.86 0.61 0.81 0.93 -0.20** -0.31**
   Dominican R. 0.86 0.70 0.82 0.91 -0.12** -0.21** 0.90 0.77 0.87 0.94 -0.10** -0.18** 0.78 0.59 0.72 0.85 -0.13** -0.26**
   Ecuador 0.75 0.60 0.74 0.84 -0.14** -0.24** 0.84 0.73 0.85 0.90 -0.11** -0.17** 0.69 0.50 0.67 0.80 -0.17** -0.30**
   El Salvador 0.78 0.56 0.74 0.86 -0.18** -0.30** 0.87 0.68 0.85 0.93 -0.17** -0.25** 0.63 0.36 0.56 0.73 -0.20** -0.37**
   Guatemala 0.65 0.45 0.55 0.73 -0.10** -0.28** 0.80 0.61 0.74 0.85 -0.13** -0.24** 0.50 0.28 0.34 0.59 -0.06* -0.31**
   Haiti 0.41 0.17 0.26 0.53 -0.09** -0.36** 0.62 0.32 0.46 0.72 -0.14** -0.40** 0.27 0.10 0.16 0.37 -0.07** -0.28**
   Honduras 0.77 0.53 0.74 0.85 -0.20** -0.31** 0.87 0.67 0.86 0.92 -0.19** -0.25** 0.67 0.42 0.61 0.77 -0.19** -0.35**
   Mexico 0.89 0.72 0.86 0.94 -0.14** -0.22** 0.92 0.78 0.90 0.96 -0.12** -0.18** 0.78 0.58 0.72 0.86 -0.15** -0.29**
   Nicaragua 0.73 0.50 0.61 0.81 -0.11** -0.31** 0.82 0.62 0.74 0.89 -0.12** -0.27** 0.57 0.30 0.42 0.67 -0.12** -0.36**
   Panama 0.92 0.80 0.90 0.96 -0.10** -0.16** 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.99 -0.06** -0.08** 0.82 0.62 0.76 0.91 -0.14** -0.29**
   Paraguay 0.88 0.71 0.83 0.93 -0.12** -0.23** 0.93 0.80 0.89 0.97 -0.08** -0.16** 0.80 0.58 0.75 0.88 -0.17** -0.30**
   Peru 0.84 0.65 0.77 0.91 -0.12** -0.26** 0.92 0.80 0.88 0.96 -0.09** -0.17** 0.67 0.40 0.53 0.79 -0.13** -0.40**
   Uruguay 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.99 -0.05** -0.06** 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.99 -0.05** -0.06**
   Venezuela 0.91 0.71 0.90 0.96 -0.19** -0.25** 0.91 0.71 0.90 0.96 -0.19** -0.25**
Rural
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
National Urban
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 4.9 
Skill levels by age groups 
Distribution of older people and adults across skill levels 
unskilled semi-skilled skilled Total unskilled semi-skilled skilled Total unskilled semi-skilled skilled
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (i) / (v) (ii) / (vi) (iii) / (vii)
   Argentina 65.3 23.2 11.6 100.0 35.0 37.4 27.6 100.0 1.9 0.6 0.4
   Bolivia 84.3 7.7 8.0 100.0 60.8 23.9 15.3 100.0 1.4 0.3 0.5
   Brazil 87.3 8.1 4.6 100.0 62.1 27.9 10.0 100.0 1.4 0.3 0.5
   Chile 65.4 27.1 7.5 100.0 30.2 48.6 21.1 100.0 2.2 0.6 0.4
   Colombia 83.9 11.5 4.6 100.0 54.2 30.3 15.5 100.0 1.5 0.4 0.3
   Costa Rica 84.5 8.8 6.7 100.0 57.7 26.9 15.4 100.0 1.5 0.3 0.4
   Dominican R. 90.9 6.4 2.7 100.0 56.5 27.8 15.7 100.0 1.6 0.2 0.2
   Ecuador 89.0 7.8 3.2 100.0 59.1 25.7 15.2 100.0 1.5 0.3 0.2
   El Salvador 89.4 7.6 3.0 100.0 58.9 29.3 11.8 100.0 1.5 0.3 0.3
   Guatemala 93.9 4.5 1.6 100.0 79.2 16.2 4.7 100.0 1.2 0.3 0.4
   Haiti 93.8 4.7 1.5 100.0 72.9 16.5 10.6 100.0 1.3 0.3 0.1
   Honduras 92.8 5.6 1.6 100.0 77.3 16.9 5.8 100.0 1.2 0.3 0.3
   Mexico 86.2 9.2 4.6 100.0 48.3 36.8 14.9 100.0 1.8 0.3 0.3
   Nicaragua 95.2 3.5 1.2 100.0 74.2 18.9 7.0 100.0 1.3 0.2 0.2
   Panama 73.0 19.1 7.9 100.0 41.8 36.9 21.3 100.0 1.7 0.5 0.4
   Paraguay 87.2 8.6 4.3 100.0 65.0 23.4 11.6 100.0 1.3 0.4 0.4
   Peru 79.9 12.9 7.2 100.0 48.3 33.1 18.6 100.0 1.7 0.4 0.4
   Uruguay 72.5 19.0 8.5 100.0 38.7 40.9 20.4 100.0 1.9 0.5 0.4
   Venezuela 83.0 11.6 5.4 100.0 50.6 32.3 17.1 100.0 1.6 0.4 0.3
RatiosOlder than 60 Between 25 - 59
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.10 
Aggregate indicator of deprivation by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49 0-24
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
 
   Argentina 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.33 0.03** 0.00 -0.10** 3
   Bolivia 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.81 0.86 0.01 0.05** 0.00 7
   Brazil 0.69 0.80 0.71 0.64 0.71 0.09** 0.16** 0.09** 7
   Chile 0.39 0.46 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.08** 0.11** 0.07** 7
   Colombia 0.51 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.55 0.09** 0.11** 0.02* 7
   Costa Rica 0.40 0.55 0.37 0.36 0.42 0.17** 0.19** 0.13** 2
   Dominican R. 0.77 0.87 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.12** 0.14** 0.09** 7
   Ecuador 0.63 0.68 0.60 0.56 0.66 0.08** 0.12** 0.02** 5
   El Salvador 0.84 0.88 0.81 0.79 0.86 0.07** 0.09** 0.02** 7
   Guatemala 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.89 0.02* 0.03** -0.04** 6
   Haiti 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.01* 0.01** 0.00 7
   Honduras 0.84 0.88 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.08** 0.08** 0.02** 7
   Jamaica 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.75 0.00 0.03* -0.06** 7
   Mexico 0.67 0.74 0.65 0.62 0.69 0.08** 0.11** 0.04** 6
   Nicaragua 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.03* 0.03** -0.01 7
   Panama 0.27 0.40 0.27 0.21 0.28 0.13** 0.19** 0.12** 2
   Paraguay 0.67 0.72 0.65 0.61 0.70 0.07** 0.10** 0.02 7
   Peru 0.65 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.70 0.07** 0.00 -0.08** 7
   Uruguay 0.28 0.33 0.21 0.22 0.31 0.12** 0.11** 0.02** 6
   Venezuela 0.46 0.50 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.10** 0.09** 0.00 7
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv) (ii)-(v) Number of criteria implemented
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4.11 
Aggregate indicator of deprivation by criterion 
The elderly vis-à-vis adults 
house house house education education+
rooms location materials head earners
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
 
   Argentina -0.04** 0.10** -0.09**
   Bolivia -0.16** -0.10** 0.13** 0.04** 0.09** 0.22** -0.18**
   Brazil 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.21** -0.08**
   Chile -0.01** -0.01** 0.03** 0.01** 0.01** 0.16** -0.06**
   Colombia -0.03** 0.00 0.02 -0.02* -0.02 0.18** -0.07**
   Costa Rica 0.29** -0.12**
   Dominican R. -0.01** -0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.05** 0.28** -0.08**
   Ecuador -0.07** 0.00 0.05** 0.27** -0.07**
   El Salvador -0.10** -0.02** 0.04** -0.01 0.04** 0.19** -0.08**
   Guatemala -0.15** 0.05** 0.00 0.00 0.16** -0.16**
   Haiti -0.05** 0.05** 0.06** 0.01 0.01* 0.11** -0.11**
   Honduras -0.04** -0.03** 0.04** 0.02 0.04** 0.23** -0.11**
   Jamaica -0.05** 0.00 -0.01* 0.02 0.01 0.11** -0.03**
   Mexico -0.06** 0.04** 0.00 0.02** 0.31** -0.09**
   Nicaragua -0.11** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.16** -0.06**
   Panama 0.21** -0.03**
   Paraguay -0.07** 0.01 0.01** 0.04** 0.03** 0.24** -0.08**
   Peru -0.05** -0.02** -0.05** -0.01 0.03* 0.20** -0.09**
   Uruguay -0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.02** 0.19** -0.06**
   Venezuela -0.05** -0.02** -0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.20** -0.08**
water restroom
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: For each criterion we report the difference between the proportion of older people who live in 
households not meeting this criterion and that of adult population. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 50
 
Table 4.12 
Health statistics by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
   Argentina 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.18 -0.02 0.02** 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.22 -0.05* 0.03
   Bolivia 0.28 0.51 0.38 0.24 0.13** 0.27** 0.37 0.45 0.36 0.37 0.09** 0.08** 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.13 -0.01 -0.03*
   Colombia
   Guatemala 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.02** 0.04** 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.46 -0.01 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.05**
   El Salvador 0.36 0.45 0.40 0.33 0.05** 0.12** 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.03 0.01 0.36 0.46 0.41 0.31 0.06 0.15**
   Nicaragua 0.46 0.73 0.58 0.38 0.15** 0.35** 0.47 0.51 0.45 0.45 0.06* 0.05** 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.01
   Panama 0.28 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.06** 0.14** 0.65 0.74 0.73 0.65 0.01 0.09** 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.16 -0.01 0.05*
   Peru 0.52 0.71 0.60 0.51 0.11** 0.20** 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.03* 0.06** 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.09**
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv) (ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
   Have been sick in last month?    Have you seen a doctor?    Economic reason for not seeing a doctor? 
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4.13 
Access to health insurance 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
   Argentina 0.64 0.83 0.62 0.57 0.21** 0.26**
   Bolivia 0.20 0.36 0.18 0.17 0.19** 0.19**
   Colombia 0.67 0.73 0.71 0.64 0.03** 0.09**
   Guatemala 0.29 0.21 0.27 0.33 -0.06** -0.12**
   El Salvador 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.00 -0.05**
   Nicaragua 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.16 -0.06** -0.09**
   Panama 0.56 0.71 0.61 0.51 0.10** 0.20**
   Peru 0.29 0.37 0.32 0.26 0.06** 0.11**
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC. 
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Table 5.1 
Share of people receiving income from pensions 
All Inactive All Inactive All Inactive All Inactive
Argentina 0.56 0.70 0.03 0.09 0.69 0.76 0.05 0.14
Bolivia 0.11 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.04
Brazil 0.77 0.82 0.09 0.22 0.86 0.87 0.12 0.29
Chile 0.55 0.61 0.03 0.07 0.63 0.66 0.06 0.11
Colombia 0.15 0.19 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.07
Costa Rica 0.34 0.39 0.02 0.06 0.39 0.42 0.04 0.09
Dominican Rep. 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.04
Ecuador 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.02 0.03
El Salvador 0.14 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.02 0.05
Guatemala 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.02
Haiti 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Honduras 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.01
Jamaica 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.03
Mexico 0.20 0.25 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.26 0.03 0.06
Nicaragua 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.02
Panama 0.39 0.47 0.03 0.09 0.41 0.48 0.05 0.14
Paraguay 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.20 0.01 0.03
Uruguay 0.78 0.87 0.08 0.24 0.87 0.90 0.12 0.36
Venezuela 0.17 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.21 0.02 0.07
60 + 24-59 65 + 24-64
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 5.2 
Share of people receiving income from pensions 
Urban areas 
All Inactive All Inactive All Inactive All Inactive
Argentina 0.56 0.70 0.03 0.09 0.69 0.76 0.05 0.14
Bolivia 0.19 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.26 0.02 0.06
Brazil 0.76 0.81 0.10 0.23 0.85 0.86 0.12 0.29
Chile 0.58 0.65 0.04 0.07 0.67 0.70 0.06 0.12
Colombia 0.19 0.23 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.22 0.03 0.09
Costa Rica 0.42 0.48 0.03 0.09 0.47 0.49 0.04 0.13
Dominican Rep. 0.14 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.05
Ecuador 0.18 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.24 0.03 0.05
El Salvador 0.20 0.26 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.03 0.08
Guatemala 0.15 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.21 0.02 0.05
Haiti 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01
Honduras 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.03
Jamaica 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.24 0.01 0.03
Mexico 0.25 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.27 0.32 0.03 0.07
Nicaragua 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.04
Panama 0.52 0.59 0.04 0.12 0.57 0.61 0.06 0.18
Paraguay 0.18 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.26 0.02 0.04
Uruguay 0.78 0.87 0.08 0.24 0.87 0.90 0.12 0.36
Venezuela 0.17 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.21 0.02 0.07
60 + 24-59 65 + 24-64
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 5.3 
Share of people receiving income from pensions 
Rural areas 
All Inactive All Inactive All Inactive All Inactive
Bolivia 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01
Brazil 0.85 0.89 0.07 0.16 0.92 0.93 0.12 0.23
Chile 0.38 0.42 0.02 0.04 0.45 0.47 0.04 0.07
Colombia 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.01
Costa Rica 0.21 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.04
Dominican Rep. 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.02
Ecuador 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01
El Salvador 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01
Guatemala 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.01
Haiti 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Honduras 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Jamaica 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.01 0.02
Mexico 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.02
Nicaragua 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00
Panama 0.19 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.03 0.06
Paraguay 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00
60 + 24-59 65 + 24-64
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Table 5.4 
Share of workers with the right to receive a pension when retired 
Total (15-24) (25-59) (60 +) (15-24) (25-59) (60 +) (15-24) (25-59) (60 +)
Argentina 0.55 0.35 0.59 0.52 0.35 0.59 0.52
Bolivia 0.26 0.07 0.34 0.16 0.07 0.36 0.21 0.07 0.24 0.00
Brazil 0.47 0.39 0.53 0.21 0.46 0.59 0.28 0.13 0.22 0.07
Chile 0.87 0.73 0.90 0.88 0.73 0.90 0.89 0.70 0.84 0.80
Ecuador 0.28 0.12 0.35 0.27 0.17 0.47 0.41 0.07 0.15 0.12
El Salvador 0.50 0.35 0.58 0.24 0.44 0.69 0.40 0.21 0.31 0.07
Guatemala 0.35 0.27 0.43 0.20 0.38 0.52 0.30 0.12 0.26 0.08
Mexico 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.32 0.50 0.27 0.12 0.21 0.05
Nicaragua 0.32 0.22 0.39 0.18 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.12 0.21 0.03
Paraguay 0.23 0.08 0.31 0.29 0.08 0.35 0.36 0.07 0.20 0.07
Peru 0.30 0.09 0.38 0.45 0.10 0.41 0.50 0.03 0.19 0.16
Uruguay 0.74 0.53 0.79 0.68 0.53 0.79 0.68
Venezuela 0.60 0.39 0.66 0.63 0.39 0.66 0.63
National Urban Rural
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Table 5.5 
Poverty headcount ratios with and without pensions 
USD 2 a day poverty line 
With Without With Without With Without With Without With Without
Argentina 11.6 19.2 4.5 39.5 12.8 15.8 3.6 45.3 12.5 16.2
Bolivia 43.1 45.8 42.1 50.4 43.2 45.5 43.8 53.5 43.1 45.4
Brazil 17.7 28.1 3.7 47.9 19.2 26.0 2.8 52.7 18.8 26.3
Chile 5.1 10.0 1.8 22.7 5.6 8.4 1.5 25.8 5.5 8.7
Costa Rica 8.5 11.8 11.2 29.7 8.2 10.1 11.5 32.8 8.3 10.4
Dominican Rep. 14.5 15.3 14.7 17.1 14.5 15.1 15.2 18.0 14.4 15.1
Ecuador 36.3 37.6 33.3 39.2 36.6 37.5 35.8 42.5 36.3 37.3
El Salvador 38.7 39.9 31.2 35.6 39.5 40.4 32.2 36.7 39.2 40.2
Guatemala 34.9 35.3 28.0 30.6 35.3 35.6 29.3 32.3 35.1 35.4
Haiti 78.0 79.4 66.4 68.8 79.2 80.4 66.0 68.4 78.8 80.1
Honduras 38.7 39.1 39.2 41.3 38.7 38.9 40.7 42.9 38.6 38.9
Jamaica 44.8 46.4 54.0 60.6 43.3 44.0 54.1 60.7 43.6 44.5
Mexico 22.0 24.6 27.1 40.4 21.5 23.1 29.5 43.5 21.5 23.4
Nicaragua 48.4 49.1 40.1 43.5 48.9 49.5 40.5 43.9 48.7 49.3
Panama 15.8 20.9 12.4 38.8 16.2 19.0 12.9 42.6 16.1 19.3
Paraguay 26.0 27.2 21.0 27.2 26.4 27.2 22.3 30.1 26.2 27.0
Uruguay 6.0 13.5 0.8 20.2 7.4 11.7 0.6 22.4 7.1 11.8
Venezuela 32.3 35.3 28.1 41.1 32.6 34.8 29.3 43.9 32.5 34.8
0-64All 60 + 0-59 65 +
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Table 5.6 
Poverty headcount ratios with and without pensions 
USD 2 a day poverty line 
Urban areas 
With Without With Without With Without With Without With Without
Argentina 11.6 19.2 4.5 39.5 12.8 15.8 3.6 45.3 12.5 16.2
Bolivia 26.2 29.4 19.4 30.9 26.6 29.3 21.9 35.9 26.3 29.2
Brazil 14.8 24.9 3.7 47.2 16.0 22.5 2.9 51.9 15.6 22.9
Chile 4.7 9.3 1.6 21.4 5.1 7.8 1.3 24.4 5.0 8.0
Colombia 21.0 24.2 25.0 37.2 20.5 22.6 27.8 40.2 20.4 22.9
Dominican Rep. 11.9 12.8 12.4 15.3 11.8 12.5 12.8 16.0 11.8 12.6
Ecuador 27.2 29.1 24.6 32.9 27.5 28.7 27.1 36.7 27.2 28.6
El Salvador 26.5 28.1 21.4 27.4 27.0 28.2 23.0 29.2 26.7 28.0
Guatemala 23.1 23.8 20.6 25.0 23.2 23.7 20.4 25.5 23.2 23.7
Haiti 66.2 68.2 60.0 63.4 66.7 68.6 62.7 65.7 66.4 68.4
Honduras 21.2 21.7 22.2 25.3 21.1 21.5 24.0 27.2 21.0 21.4
Jamaica 47.6 49.3 56.4 65.2 46.1 46.6 56.2 65.1 46.5 47.3
Mexico 15.6 18.2 20.4 35.4 15.1 16.6 22.7 38.5 15.1 17.0
Nicaragua 37.9 38.9 33.8 37.9 38.2 39.0 35.7 39.8 38.0 38.9
Panama 6.2 11.1 4.8 32.2 6.3 8.9 4.7 36.2 6.3 9.4
Paraguay 14.8 16.4 14.5 23.2 14.8 15.8 16.4 27.7 14.7 15.8
Uruguay 6.0 13.5 0.8 20.2 7.4 11.7 0.6 22.4 7.1 11.8
Venezuela 32.3 35.3 28.1 41.1 32.6 34.8 29.3 43.9 32.5 34.8
0-64All 60 + 0-59 65 +
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC 
 
Table 5.7 
Poverty headcount ratios with and without pensions 
USD 2 a day poverty line 
Rural areas 
With Without With Without With Without With Without With Without
Bolivia 72.6 74.2 67.7 72.3 73.0 74.4 67.9 72.9 72.8 74.3
Brazil 31.9 43.9 3.5 51.3 35.0 43.1 2.6 56.9 34.0 43.0
Chile 8.0 15.0 2.9 29.1 8.9 12.7 2.2 32.7 8.7 13.0
Dominican Rep. 19.3 19.8 18.1 19.8 19.4 19.7 18.9 21.0 19.3 19.7
Ecuador 46.6 47.4 41.6 45.2 47.2 47.6 43.9 47.9 46.8 47.3
El Salvador 56.9 57.3 47.6 49.2 57.8 58.1 47.7 49.4 57.5 57.9
Guatemala 44.7 44.8 35.8 36.5 45.2 45.3 39.1 39.8 44.9 45.0
Haiti 85.7 86.6 69.5 71.4 87.5 88.3 67.6 69.7 87.1 87.9
Honduras 59.6 59.8 60.8 61.6 59.6 59.6 61.9 62.9 59.5 59.6
Jamaica 42.5 43.9 52.0 56.8 40.8 41.7 52.4 57.1 41.1 42.1
Mexico 42.7 45.2 44.0 53.0 42.5 44.3 46.2 55.9 42.4 44.3
Nicaragua 62.7 63.1 50.3 52.5 63.5 63.8 48.2 50.4 63.4 63.7
Panama 32.2 37.5 23.9 48.8 33.2 36.2 24.9 52.0 32.8 36.4
Paraguay 40.6 41.2 29.6 32.4 41.5 41.9 29.9 33.0 41.2 41.6
0-64All 60 + 0-59 65 +
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC 
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Table 5.8 
Poverty headcount ratios  
Micro-simulations  
Elderly defined as older than 60 
Panel A
Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor
Argentina 11.6 11.0 11.1 11.1 11.1 4.5 2.0 3.7 0.8 2.3 12.8 12.5 12.4 12.8 12.6
Bolivia 43.1 40.8 41.3 40.6 41.4 42.1 18.3 30.6 0.1 21.7 43.2 42.3 42.0 43.2 42.7
Brazil 17.7 17.4 17.5 17.5 17.5 3.7 2.3 3.3 1.3 2.5 19.2 19.1 19.0 19.2 19.1
Chile 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 1.8 1.3 1.5 0.9 1.4 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.5
Costa Rica 8.5 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.7 11.2 4.8 8.0 2.2 5.5 8.2 7.8 7.8 8.2 8.0
Dominican Rep. 14.5 12.5 12.8 13.2 12.9 14.7 5.4 9.2 0.5 6.4 14.5 13.3 13.1 14.5 13.6
Ecuador 36.3 33.0 33.7 33.2 34.2 33.3 14.9 25.1 1.7 19.1 36.6 35.0 34.6 36.6 35.8
El Salvador 38.7 35.5 35.8 35.9 36.5 31.2 16.0 22.8 1.1 19.2 39.5 37.5 37.1 39.5 38.3
Guatemala 34.9 32.9 33.1 33.2 33.6 28.0 13.1 19.6 0.8 16.3 35.3 34.2 33.9 35.3 34.7
Haiti 78.0 73.8 74.4 71.9 75.2 66.4 42.0 54.9 0.1 47.3 79.2 77.1 76.4 79.2 78.0
Honduras 38.7 36.1 36.4 36.1 37.0 39.2 22.8 31.2 0.7 26.8 38.7 37.0 36.7 38.7 37.8
Jamaica 44.8 40.5 42.8 38.2 40.8 54.0 31.4 50.5 7.6 31.7 43.3 42.0 41.5 43.3 42.3
Mexico 22.0 19.7 20.6 19.8 20.4 27.1 11.1 23.0 1.7 13.1 21.5 20.6 20.3 21.5 21.1
Nicaragua 48.4 45.7 45.7 46.0 46.8 40.1 27.1 33.4 2.4 31.9 48.9 46.9 46.5 48.9 47.8
Panama 15.8 14.6 14.9 14.8 14.9 12.4 6.3 9.2 2.3 7.4 16.2 15.6 15.5 16.2 15.8
Paraguay 26.0 24.0 24.1 24.4 24.7 21.0 9.4 14.0 0.3 12.0 26.4 25.1 24.9 26.4 25.7
Peru 30.2 27.4 27.6 28.3 28.5 21.0 8.0 12.8 0.0 11.7 31.1 29.3 29.1 31.1 30.2
Uruguay 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.3
Venezuela 32.3 30.5 30.7 30.4 31.1 28.1 17.3 23.5 1.9 19.7 32.6 31.5 31.3 32.6 32.0
Panel B
Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor
Argentina 20.1 19.8 19.8 20.1 19.9 12.1 11.8 11.8 12.1 11.9 8.6 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.4
Bolivia 50.9 50.4 50.1 50.9 50.6 37.0 35.6 35.4 37.0 36.3 37.7 36.7 36.4 37.7 37.1
Brazil 30.4 30.2 30.2 30.4 30.3 17.7 17.5 17.5 17.7 17.6 12.9 12.8 12.8 12.9 12.9
Chile 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.2 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1
Costa Rica 11.3 11.0 11.0 11.3 11.2 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.1 6.0 6.5 6.2
Dominican Rep. 20.4 19.0 18.8 20.4 19.4 12.4 10.8 10.7 12.4 11.2 10.8 10.0 9.9 10.8 10.2
Ecuador 45.0 43.5 43.2 45.0 44.3 31.9 30.3 29.9 31.9 31.2 30.9 29.2 28.8 30.9 30.1
El Salvador 49.2 47.1 46.9 49.2 48.0 36.4 34.0 33.6 36.4 35.0 32.3 30.4 30.1 32.3 31.1
Guatemala 43.3 42.3 42.0 43.3 42.7 27.7 26.5 26.3 27.7 27.1 29.6 28.5 28.2 29.6 29.0
Haiti 85.2 83.5 82.9 85.2 84.3 76.9 74.5 73.5 76.9 75.5 73.4 71.1 70.5 73.4 72.2
Honduras 47.1 45.4 45.1 47.1 46.1 31.8 30.0 29.8 31.8 30.8 33.0 31.4 31.2 33.0 32.2
Jamaica 48.4 47.4 47.0 48.4 47.7 43.1 41.6 41.2 43.1 42.0 38.6 37.2 36.7 38.6 37.3
Mexico 28.1 27.1 27.0 28.1 27.6 19.4 18.4 18.2 19.4 19.0 17.4 16.4 16.2 17.4 16.9
Nicaragua 57.6 55.9 55.5 57.6 56.6 44.4 42.1 41.5 44.4 43.2 41.3 39.2 38.9 41.3 40.1
Panama 23.5 22.8 22.7 23.5 22.9 13.6 13.0 13.0 13.6 13.2 11.8 11.2 11.1 11.8 11.4
Paraguay 33.8 32.6 32.3 33.8 33.1 22.9 21.5 21.2 22.9 22.2 20.7 19.6 19.4 20.7 20.1
Peru 42.4 40.5 40.3 42.4 41.5 25.6 23.9 23.5 25.6 24.8 24.4 22.8 22.6 24.4 23.6
Uruguay 12.6 12.4 12.4 12.6 12.5 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.5 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.5
Venezuela 42.3 41.1 40.9 42.3 41.7 29.7 28.6 28.3 29.7 29.1 26.4 25.3 25.0 26.4 25.8
All 60 + 0-59
<15 15-24 25-59
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC 
 
 
Table 5.9 
Poverty headcount ratios  
Micro-simulations  
Elderly defined as older than 65 
Panel A
Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor
Argentina 11.6 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.3 3.6 1.6 2.9 0.7 1.7 12.5 12.4 12.3 12.5 12.4
Bolivia 43.1 41.4 41.8 41.3 41.8 43.8 17.6 31.6 0.0 21.2 43.1 42.4 42.3 43.1 42.7
Brazil 17.7 17.6 17.6 17.6 17.6 2.8 2.0 2.7 1.4 2.1 18.8 18.7 18.7 18.8 18.7
Chile 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 1.5 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.2 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.4
Costa Rica 8.5 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.9 11.5 5.6 8.4 2.2 6.0 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.3 8.1
Dominican Rep. 14.5 13.1 13.3 13.5 13.3 15.2 5.4 9.4 0.6 6.2 14.4 13.6 13.5 14.4 13.8
Ecuador 36.3 33.9 34.4 33.9 34.6 35.8 16.0 27.2 2.1 20.1 36.3 35.2 34.9 36.3 35.7
El Salvador 38.7 36.2 36.5 36.6 37.1 32.2 16.5 23.6 1.2 20.0 39.2 37.7 37.4 39.2 38.3
Guatemala 34.9 33.5 33.6 33.7 34.0 29.3 13.8 21.3 1.1 17.7 35.1 34.3 34.1 35.1 34.7
Haiti 78.0 74.9 75.3 73.6 76.0 66.0 42.0 55.0 0.1 47.5 78.8 77.3 76.8 78.8 78.0
Honduras 38.7 36.9 37.1 36.8 37.5 40.7 23.9 32.6 0.6 27.4 38.6 37.5 37.4 38.6 38.0
Jamaica 44.8 41.4 43.2 39.5 41.7 54.1 32.4 50.7 8.0 32.8 43.6 42.6 42.2 43.6 42.8
Mexico 22.0 20.4 21.1 20.3 20.9 29.5 11.9 25.2 1.8 14.1 21.5 20.9 20.8 21.5 21.3
Nicaragua 48.4 46.5 46.4 46.7 47.3 40.5 28.2 33.7 2.9 32.2 48.7 47.3 47.0 48.7 48.0
Panama 15.8 14.9 15.1 15.1 15.2 12.9 6.4 9.6 2.2 7.7 16.1 15.5 15.5 16.1 15.7
Paraguay 26.0 24.6 24.7 24.9 25.0 22.3 10.1 15.1 0.4 12.7 26.2 25.3 25.2 26.2 25.7
Peru 30.2 28.1 28.3 28.9 29.0 19.9 7.2 12.1 0.0 11.1 30.9 29.6 29.4 30.9 30.3
Uruguay 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1
Venezuela 32.3 31.0 31.2 31.0 31.5 29.3 18.1 25.0 2.2 20.6 32.5 31.7 31.5 32.5 32.1
Panel B
Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor Current Benchmark Altruism Egoistic Labor
Argentina 20.1 19.9 19.9 20.1 20.0 12.1 12.0 12.0 12.1 12.0 8.5 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.3
Bolivia 50.9 50.5 50.3 50.9 50.7 37.0 36.0 35.9 37.0 36.5 37.8 37.0 36.8 37.8 37.3
Brazil 30.4 30.3 30.3 30.4 30.4 17.7 17.6 17.6 17.7 17.7 12.5 12.4 12.4 12.5 12.4
Chile 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Costa Rica 11.3 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.2 6.7 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.7 6.5
Dominican Rep. 20.4 19.4 19.3 20.4 19.7 12.4 11.5 11.4 12.4 11.7 11.0 10.3 10.2 11.0 10.4
Ecuador 45.0 44.0 43.7 45.0 44.5 31.9 31.0 30.7 31.9 31.4 30.6 29.4 29.0 30.6 30.0
El Salvador 49.2 47.6 47.5 49.2 48.3 36.4 34.7 34.4 36.4 35.4 32.0 30.5 30.2 32.0 31.1
Guatemala 43.3 42.6 42.3 43.3 42.9 27.7 27.0 26.7 27.7 27.4 29.4 28.5 28.2 29.4 29.0
Haiti 85.2 83.8 83.5 85.2 84.7 76.9 75.3 74.7 76.9 75.9 73.0 71.2 70.7 73.0 72.1
Honduras 47.1 46.0 45.9 47.1 46.5 31.8 30.7 30.6 31.8 31.3 33.1 32.0 31.8 33.1 32.5
Jamaica 48.4 47.6 47.5 48.4 47.9 43.1 41.7 41.3 43.1 42.2 39.7 38.6 38.0 39.7 38.7
Mexico 28.1 27.5 27.4 28.1 27.8 19.4 18.8 18.7 19.4 19.3 17.7 17.0 16.8 17.7 17.4
Nicaragua 57.6 56.5 56.2 57.6 57.0 44.4 42.8 42.3 44.4 43.6 41.2 39.6 39.3 41.2 40.4
Panama 23.5 22.9 22.9 23.5 23.1 13.6 13.2 13.2 13.6 13.3 11.8 11.2 11.2 11.8 11.4
Paraguay 33.8 32.9 32.8 33.8 33.3 22.9 22.2 22.0 22.9 22.6 20.6 19.7 19.6 20.6 20.1
Peru 42.4 40.9 40.8 42.4 41.8 25.6 24.4 24.3 25.6 25.1 24.4 23.1 22.9 24.4 23.7
Uruguay 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Venezuela 42.3 41.6 41.4 42.3 41.9 29.7 29.0 28.8 29.7 29.3 26.4 25.5 25.4 26.4 25.9
All 65 + 0-64
<15 15-24 25-64
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC 
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Table 5.10 
Cost of programs 
As % of household per capita income  
All Poor
Argentina 0.7% 0.1%
Bolivia 2.3% 1.2%
Brazil 0.3% 0.0%
Chile 0.4% 0.0%
Costa Rica 0.7% 0.1%
Dominican Rep. 2.0% 0.3%
Ecuador 3.6% 1.3%
El Salvador 4.1% 1.5%
Guatemala 2.5% 0.8%
Haiti 10.5% 6.8%
Honduras 2.6% 1.1%
Jamaica 5.0% 2.8%
Mexico 1.9% 0.7%
Nicaragua 3.0% 1.3%
Panama 0.6% 0.2%
Paraguay 1.9% 0.5%
Peru 3.6% 0.7%
Uruguay 0.5% 0.0%
Venezuela 2.5% 0.9%
Cost 
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Table 6.1 
Isopoverty curves: axis intercepts and transfer cost 
Poverty line 2 U$S PPP a day 
X axis Y axis Cost (1) X axis Y axis Cost (1) X axis Y axis Cost (1)
(alpha=0) (g=0) (% national 
income)
(alpha=0) (g=0) (% national 
income)
(alpha=0) (g=0) (% national 
income)
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
   Argentina 2005 6.06 0.01 0.01 6.06 0.06 0.06 6.06 1.28 1.26
   Bolivia 2002 6.77 0.18 0.17 6.77 0.73 0.67 6.77 1.73 1.58
   Brazil 2004 4.24 0.01 0.01 4.24 0.03 0.03 4.24 0.74 0.73
   Chile 2003 2.56 0.00 0.00 2.56 0.01 0.01 2.56 0.45 0.45
   Colombia 2004 14.49 0.17 0.17 14.49 0.75 0.72 14.49 2.47 2.39
   Costa Rica 2004 6.14 0.02 0.02 6.14 0.07 0.07 6.14 0.70 0.69
   Dominican R. 2005 4.18 0.03 0.03 4.18 0.12 0.11 4.18 0.79 0.77
   Ecuador 2003 5.22 0.19 0.17 5.22 0.74 0.67 5.22 2.21 2.01
   El Salvador 2004 4.98 0.18 0.16 4.98 0.73 0.64 4.98 2.32 2.07
   Guatemala 2004 4.32 0.08 0.07 4.32 0.33 0.30 4.32 1.17 1.06
   Haiti 2001 6.24 1.69 1.11 6.24 5.96 3.92 6.24 8.98 5.90
   Honduras 2005 7.18 0.15 0.14 7.18 0.60 0.55 7.18 1.53 1.41
   Jamaica 2002 19.97 0.90 0.85 19.97 3.01 2.86 19.97 5.58 5.30
   Mexico 2004 10.49 0.13 0.13 10.49 0.54 0.52 10.49 1.98 1.91
   Nicaragua 2001 3.86 0.16 0.13 3.86 0.66 0.56 3.86 1.64 1.39
   Panama 2004 4.23 0.02 0.02 4.23 0.09 0.08 4.23 0.69 0.68
   Paraguay 2004 4.57 0.05 0.04 4.57 0.20 0.19 4.57 0.94 0.89
   Peru 2003 3.12 0.06 0.06 3.12 0.25 0.23 3.12 1.17 1.08
   Uruguay 2005 1.86 0.00 0.00 1.86 0.01 0.01 1.86 0.72 0.71
   Venezuela 2004 7.25 0.14 0.13 7.25 0.57 0.53 7.25 2.04 1.87
Universal transfersTargeted transfers Intermediate transfers
Country Year
 
Notes: (1) Calculated assuming no economic growth (g=0)  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Table 7.1 
National poverty  
Before and after simulation of changes in the  
demographic and educational structure of the population  
before after before after before after
   Argentina 2005 13.9 11.1 5.6 4.7 3.3 2.8
   Bolivia 2002 48.0 34.3 27.2 17.2 20.0 11.1
   Brazil 2004 21.0 9.2 9.7 4.3 6.6 2.9
   Chile 2003 7.6 5.1 3.0 1.8 1.9 1.1
   Colombia 2004 33.4 18.3 22.6 8.8 19.1 5.9
   Costa Rica 2004 12.2 7.0 7.8 3.2 6.5 2.2
   Dominican R. 2005 19.7 12.6 7.9 4.8 4.6 2.7
   Ecuador 2003 39.4 14.3 17.6 6.0 10.8 3.6
   El Salvador 2004 42.6 27.0 20.8 12.3 14.3 7.8
   Guatemala 2004 37.8 20.1 16.1 8.9 9.4 5.4
   Haiti 2001 81.5 53.2 55.7 36.2 43.0 28.9
   Honduras 2005 49.7 29.5 30.2 17.6 23.2 13.6
   Mexico 2004 24.6 16.2 12.4 7.7 9.0 5.3
   Nicaragua 2001 52.5 27.6 24.1 14.0 14.6 9.2
   Panama 2004 15.8 12.4 6.7 6.8 3.8 4.9
   Paraguay 2004 30.4 19.9 13.7 8.2 8.3 4.8
   Peru 2003 33.1 26.9 13.4 11.2 7.2 6.4
   Uruguay 2005 8.1 8.2 2.1 3.0 0.8 1.6
   Venezuela 2004 37.3 23.2 19.4 9.9 14.1 6.2
Country Year
Gap Severity
FGT(1) FGT(2)
Incidence 
FGT(0)
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty line 2 U$S PPP a day 
 
Table 7.2 
Old age poverty 
Before and after simulation of changes in the  
demographic and educational structure of the population  
before after before after before after
   Argentina 2005 4.9 3.7 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.6
   Bolivia 2002 46.8 28.1 28.1 14.6 21.1 9.9
   Brazil 2004 5.0 3.2 2.1 1.4 1.6 1.0
   Chile 2003 3.7 2.6 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.7
   Colombia 2004 34.6 16.8 25.2 9.7 22.3 7.7
   Costa Rica 2004 13.9 7.8 8.8 4.4 7.3 3.5
   Dominican R. 2005 23.5 15.7 11.6 8.0 8.0 5.7
   Ecuador 2003 37.4 17.0 17.7 8.0 11.3 5.2
   El Salvador 2004 37.1 21.8 18.2 9.5 12.6 6.0
   Guatemala 2004 30.2 21.1 12.7 9.8 7.6 6.2
   Haiti 2001 78.0 54.4 51.8 38.5 39.3 31.4
   Honduras 2005 49.7 33.3 29.9 20.8 22.6 16.1
   Mexico 2004 29.7 18.1 19.0 11.7 15.6 9.9
   Nicaragua 2001 44.4 25.7 20.1 12.3 12.4 8.0
   Panama 2004 12.4 7.4 4.8 3.9 2.7 2.9
   Paraguay 2004 26.0 17.7 11.4 7.9 7.0 5.1
   Peru 2003 24.7 16.6 8.7 6.5 4.3 3.8
   Uruguay 2005 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
   Venezuela 2004 32.2 16.3 19.3 8.4 15.3 6.2
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2)
Severity
Country Year
Incidence Gap
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty line 2 U$S PPP a day 
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Table 7.3 
Decomposition of the change in poverty  
after simulation of changes in the  
demographic and educational structure of the population 
                                   National poverty                                               Old age poverty
before after education ageing before after education ageing
   Argentina 2005 13.9 11.1 -2.8 -1.8 -0.9 4.9 3.7 -1.2 -1.2 0.0
   Bolivia 2002 48.0 34.3 -13.7 -12.4 -1.3 46.8 28.1 -18.7 -18.3 -0.4
   Brazil 2004 21.0 9.2 -11.9 -10.5 -1.4 5.0 3.2 -1.9 -1.9 0.0
   Chile 2003 7.6 5.1 -2.5 -2.0 -0.6 3.7 2.6 -1.1 -1.2 0.1
   Colombia 2004 33.4 18.3 -15.1 -14.5 -0.6 34.6 16.8 -17.8 -17.7 -0.1
   Costa Rica 2004 12.2 7.0 -5.2 -5.0 -0.2 13.9 7.8 -6.1 -6.0 -0.1
   Dominican R. 2005 19.7 12.6 -7.1 -6.4 -0.7 23.5 15.7 -7.8 -6.4 -1.4
   Ecuador 2003 39.4 14.3 -25.1 -24.0 -1.2 37.4 17.0 -20.4 -19.8 -0.7
   El Salvador 2004 42.6 27.0 -15.5 -14.2 -1.4 37.1 21.8 -15.3 -15.1 -0.2
   Guatemala 2004 37.8 20.1 -17.7 -16.8 -0.8 30.2 21.1 -9.1 -9.4 0.3
   Haiti 2001 81.5 53.2 -28.3 -27.4 -1.0 78.0 54.4 -23.6 -23.2 -0.3
   Honduras 2005 49.7 29.5 -20.2 -18.8 -1.4 49.7 33.3 -16.4 -16.1 -0.2
   Mexico 2004 24.6 16.2 -8.3 -7.4 -0.9 29.7 18.1 -11.7 -11.3 -0.3
   Nicaragua 2001 52.5 27.6 -25.0 -23.8 -1.2 44.4 25.7 -18.7 -18.1 -0.6
   Panama 2004 15.8 12.4 -3.5 -2.5 -1.0 12.4 7.4 -5.0 -4.9 0.0
   Paraguay 2004 30.4 19.9 -10.5 -9.8 -0.7 26.0 17.7 -8.3 -8.6 0.4
   Peru 2003 33.1 26.9 -6.3 -5.0 -1.3 24.7 16.6 -8.1 -8.6 0.5
   Uruguay 2005 8.1 8.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 1.4 1.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.0
   Venezuela 2004 37.3 23.2 -14.1 -12.6 -1.5 32.2 16.3 -15.9 -15.8 -0.1
EffectsChangeLevelChange EffectsLevel
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty line 2 U$S PPP a day 
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 Table B3.1 
Subjective poverty by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
National 67.14 70.32 66.40 65.94 3.92** 4.38**
Urban 60.47 63.45 59.32 59.49 4.13** 3.96**
Rural 87.63 90.71 87.97 86.68 2.73 4.03**
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
 
Source: own calculations based on Colombia’s ECV. 
 
Table B3.2 
Marginal probabilities 
Subjective poverty in Colombia 
Male 0.04249***
[0.01133]
semi-skilled -0.22518***
[0.01442]
skilled -0.39892***
[0.01879]
aged 25 to 49 0.02726*
[0.01543]
aged 50 to 59 -0.00291
[0.01758]
Urban -0.18638***
[0.01121]
Household size 0.01134***
[0.00279]
Out of labor force -0.00269
[0.01563]
Unemployed 0.07991***
[0.02397]
entrepeneur -0.20201***
[0.03279]
profesional self-employed -0.03518
[0.04209]
non-profesional self-employed 0.03193**
[0.01442]
zero wage worker 0.05884
[0.04430]
Observations 21206
Chi2 2236.75
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1
 
Source: own calculations based on Colombia’s ECV. 
 
Table B4.5 
Hunger by age groups 
All 60+ 50-59 25-49 All 60+ 50-59 25-49
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
National 17.68 15.72 19.65 18.07 -3.93 -2.35 9.15 9.44 9.26 8.89 0.18 0.55
Urban 17.26 15.38 19.27 17.52 -3.89 -2.14 8.97 8.26 9.25 8.97 -0.98 -0.71
Rural 30.13 26.32 30.31 33.25 -3.99 -6.94 9.76 12.90 9.29 8.60 3.60 4.30**
ARGENTINA COLOMBIA
(ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv) (ii)-(iii) (ii)-(iv)
  
Source: own calculations based on ISCA(2002) and ECV(2003).  
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 Table B6.1 
National effects of halving poverty for the elderly 
National poverty headcount ratio  
Observed Simulated
   Argentina 2005 12.9 12.5
   Bolivia 2002 44.5 43.1
   Brazil 2004 18.3 18.1
   Chile 2003 5.5 5.4
   Colombia 2004 33.4 31.6
   Costa Rica 2004 11.4 10.8
   Dominican R. 2005 14.5 13.8
   Ecuador 2003 36.7 35.0
   El Salvador 2004 38.7 37.3
   Guatemala 2004 34.9 34.0
   Haiti 2001 77.9 74.9
   Honduras 2005 47.5 45.7
   Jamaica 2002 50.5 47.3
   Mexico 2004 22.4 21.2
   Nicaragua 2001 48.4 47.1
   Panama 2004 15.8 15.2
   Paraguay 2004 26.0 25.2
   Peru 2003 30.2 29.2
   Uruguay 2005 6.1 6.0
   Venezuela 2004 36.1 35.0  
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Figure 2.1 
Population structure by age and major area 
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Source: own calculations based on Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, February 
2005. 
Note: Medium fertility and AIDS mortality variant 
 
Figure 2.2 
LAC annual growth population rate  
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Source: own calculations based on Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, February 
2005. 
Note: Medium fertility and AIDS mortality variant 
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Figure 2.3 
LAC annual growth rate of ratio +60/<60 (1950-2000) 
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Source: own calculations based on Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, February 
2005. 
Note: Medium fertility and AIDS mortality variant 
 
 
Figure 2.4 
Share of elderly people in total population - LAC 
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Source: own calculations based on Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, February 
2005. 
Note: Medium fertility and AIDS mortality variant 
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Figure 2.5 
Population structure by age 
(Last available year) 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Figure 2.6 
Share of the elderly in total population 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Figure 2.7 
Population ratios 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Figure 2.8 
Share of females by age group  
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Figure 2.9 
a. Average family size by age b. Average family size by area (>60) 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Figure 2.10 
a. Household head by age b. Household head by area (>60) 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Figure 3.1 
National and old age poverty headcount ratios 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty is defined as household per capita income below the USD2 a day (PPP) line. 
 
Figure 3.2 
Adult and old age poverty headcount ratios 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: Poverty is defined as household per capita income below the USD2 a day (PPP) line. 
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Figure 3.3 
Poverty headcount ratio by age 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note 1: Non-parametric estimations (kernels). 
Note 2 : Poverty is defined as household per capita income below the USD2 a day (PPP) line. 
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Figure 3.3 (cont.) 
Poverty headcount ratio by age 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note 1: Non-parametric estimations (kernels). 
Note 2 : Poverty is defined as household per capita income below the USD2 a day (PPP) line. 
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Figure 3.4 
Poverty by age 
Equivalized income using adult equivalents and economies of scale 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note 1: Non-parametric estimations (kernels). 
Note 2 : Poverty defined with household per capita income and equivalized income (adult equivalent 0.25 
if age lower than 5, and 0.5 if age between 6 and 14; parameter of internal economies of scale=0.8) 
 
Figure 3.5 
Ratio of poverty older than 60/younger than 60 
By parameter of economies of scale  
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Figure 3.6 
Scatter plot ratio poverty +60/-60 with other variables 
Share of old people receiving pensions, gap in years of education +60/(25-59), 
And gap in household size +60/-60 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
Note: poverty measured with household per capita income and the USD2 line.  
 
Figure 3.7 
Concentration curves 
Distribution of the elderly along the income distribution 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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 Figure 3.8 
Scatter plot between mean age and 
the Gini coefficient for the distribution of per capita income 
LAC countries, early 2000s 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
 
 72
 
Figure 4.1 
Distribution by type of work  
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Figure 4.2 
Hours worked by age 
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Figure 4.3 
Housing by age groups 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC 
 
Figure 4.4 
Literacy gap and poverty 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Figure 4.5 
Unskilled ratio and poverty 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
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Figure 4.6 
Self-perception of health status and age 
Colombia, ECV 2003 
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Source: own calculations based on Colombia’s ECV microdata.  
Non-parametric estimation (lowess) of positive self-perception of health status 
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Figure 5.1 
Share of people receiving income from pensions 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
Share of people receiving income from pensions 
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Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
 
Figure 5.3 
Share of people receiving income from pensions 
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Figure 6.1 
Isopoverty curves 
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Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys 
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Figure 6.1 
Isopoverty curves 
(continue) 
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Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys 
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Figure 6.1 
Isopoverty curves 
(continue) 
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Figure B3.1 
Poverty headcount ratio by age 
Nicaragua, 2001 
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Figure B3.2 
Self-perception of poverty 
Colombia, ECV 2003 
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Source: own calculations based on Colombia’s ECV. 
 
Figure B6.1 
National effects of halving poverty for the elderly 
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